Economic Analysis of Voluntary Carbon Offset Market and Bioenergy Policies by Shiva, Layla
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF VOLUNTARY CARBON OFFSET 
MARKET AND BIOENERGY POLICIES 
 
A Dissertation 
by 
LAYLA SHIVA 
 
 
Submitted to the Office of Graduate and Professional Studies  of 
Texas A&M University 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
  
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
      Chair of Committee,  David A. Bessler 
Co-Chair of Committee, Bruce A. McCarl 
Committee Members,  Henry L. Bryant 
       Haeshin Hwang 
Head of Department,       C. Parr Rosson 
 
December 2014 
 
Major Subject: Agricultural Economics 
 
Copyright 2014 Layla Shiva 
ii 
 
 ABSTRACT  
 
This work studies the economic implications of some United States greenhouse gas 
mitigation related policies. The main items focused on in this work are: 1) possible 
agricultural entry into a voluntary carbon offset market, 2) use of marginal land for 
switchgrass production and 3) agriculture and energy market effects of renewable fuel 
standards and the integration between these two markets. 
The first element of the study addressed participation in a voluntary carbon offset 
market under alternative baseline specifications. We find that a per unit baseline 
augmented with a low initial level hybrid baseline for biofuel provides effectiveness in 
terms of additionality, leakage and program cost. We also find that voluntary offset 
markets promote large scale mitigation which decreases traditional agricultural 
production and so decreases consumers' surplus and increase producer’s surplus.   
The second study component examines the economic implications of growing 
switchgrass on marginal land. We simulate production patterns and market conditions 
when using or not using marginal land with and without a carbon offset program. We 
find using marginal land contributes heavily in satisfying RFS mandates and takes the 
pressure off of conventional land use. However with a simultaneous offset program we 
find that most of the switchgrass goes to electricity generation and that the pressure on 
conventional land use is unabated. 
The third study component examines the energy–agriculture linkage using a 
structural vector autoregression model. The results of directed acyclic graph presents at 
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contemporaneous time corn price fluctuations cause changes in soybean and ethanol 
prices.  We perform conditional forecasting, taking into account the renewable fuel 
standards policies, and compare the forecasted path of prices with and without the 
renewable fuels mandates. Results of prices forecasts conditional on RFS requirements 
present an increase in all prices in the model by 2022 except for the crack ratio. 
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CHAPTER I   
INTRODUCTION 
 
Agriculture, energy and climate change have a complex relationship.  Both 
agriculture and most forms of energy generation emit greenhouse gasses (GHGs) 
contributing to climate change.  Agriculture also produces commodities that can be used 
to produce energy, perhaps reducing the amount of GHGs emitted. Additionally, there  
are agricultural actions by which GHG emissions can be reduced, contributing to a 
mitigation of climate change that involve altered operations or bioenergy feedstock 
production (Field et al. 2014). These actions, in turn, will influence agricultural markets. 
Despite agriculture being widely acknowledged as a possible GHG mitigation strategy, 
its implementation has been low and alternative policy designs may be needed. This 
thesis investigates these issues.  We will specifically examine:  
• Agricultural mitigation supply under a mandatory and a voluntary market design; 
• Agricultural production possibilities for bioenergy feedstocks using marginal 
lands; 
• Agricultural market interrelationships with energy markets. 
Each of these is further discussed below. 
1.1 Agriculture as a Mitigation Source  
Climate change has become a major social concern. One principal driving force is 
societal GHG emissions, the bulk of which come from fossil fuel usage, but another 
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significant component involves agriculture and forestry. Agricultural related GHG 
mitigation strategies have been argued to be cost effective options that can contribute in 
global climate change management (Field et al. 2014) but the extent of their contribution 
depends on prices and market rules. This thesis will investigate GHG market designs in 
terms of their ability to cost effectively encourage agricultural GHG mitigation.  
Cap and trade schemes are one possible policy vehicle for implementing GHG 
emission limits. To implement this, the government sets a limit or cap on the amount of 
GHGs that may be emitted. The cap is sold, auctioned, or otherwise distributed to firms 
in the form of emission permits. Firms then are required to hold permits equivalent to 
their emissions. They can trade the permits.  
 An issue with cap and trade scheme is that in implementation the agricultural and 
forestry (AF) sectors are not very likely to be covered by a cap.  To date the AF sectors 
have been outside the cap in all implemented schemes and in the US it is unlikely that 
the AF sectors will be capped (Murray 2010). Recently attention has been paid to 
voluntary participation programs with market based incentives, where AF can 
voluntarily choose to produce carbon offsets. If a farmer chooses to join the program 
(opt in), then she is going to be directly paid for the GHG abatement and also will be 
provided with liability for any future greenhouse gas emissions. 
  Because of asymmetric information between the regulator, who pays for the 
abatement and the farmers, who provide it, we are facing an adverse selection issue in 
this market. In particular while there is the desire to only pay for additional GHG offsets 
the market design must prevent this. A design that regulators frequently use to avoid 
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paying for non-additional production is the baseline method. In this policy design, the 
regulator sets a baseline and pays for reduction in emissions below the baseline level.  
Another challenge facing policy makers regarding offset markets is leakage. Leakage 
occurs when mitigation activities by covered entities causes direct or indirect GHG 
emissions by uncovered entities. For instance, promoting mitigation policies in a 
political jurisdiction may increase fossil fuel prices; this may, in turn, lead to reallocation 
of production of fossil fuels elsewhere, in another political jurisdiction that has less strict 
mitigation rules (Hennessy et al. 2007). 
The first essay of this thesis considers modeling voluntary carbon offset programs in 
agriculture when farmers can choose to opt in. In this work we simulate carbon market 
participation under alternative baseline schemes and carbon prices to see the effect on 
farmer’s decisions to opt in or not.  To do this we use the agricultural part of the Forest 
and Agriculture sector optimization model Green House Gas (FASOM-GHG) version 
(Lee et al. 2004; Adams et al. 2005; Beach et al. 2010). We will also perform a marginal 
cost comparison among different scenarios, and figure out the additionality and leakage 
consequences across alternative carbon prices and market designs. Also we will examine 
the international leakage by looking at price and export change in some major countries. 
The international leakage argument is that regulation in one country may shift 
production to other countries (Murry et al. 2004; Searchinger et al. 2008). Rise in other 
countries exports and prices could indicate international leakage. 
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1.2 Agriculture as a Biofuel Feedstock Producer 
Agriculture could also mitigate GHGs through production of alternative bioenergy 
sources (Schneider and McCarl 2003; McCarl 2008). Bioenergy is produced when 
biomass, commodities are converted to liquid fuels, heat or electricity.  Today, we use 
agricultural products such as corn and sugarcane to produce ethanol and biodiesel as 
substitutes for gasoline and diesel with some limited use of processing by products for 
heat and electricity. Providing substitute products generally involves recycling of carbon 
dioxide (CO2), a greenhouse gas, because plant growth absorbs CO2 while combustion 
releases it (McCarl 2008).  Thus producing bioenergy can replace fossil fuel intensive 
products or production processes and reduce GHG emissions (McCarl 2008).  
The main federal biofuel policy is the renewable fuel standard (RFS). The Energy 
Policy Act of 2005, introduced what is now called RFS1; this required 7.5 billion gallons 
of renewable fuel be blended by 2012. This policy was expanded by the 2007 Energy 
Independence and Security Act, which requires higher volumes plus differentiates 
among biofuels based on their lifecycle GHG content, the features of which are now 
called RFS2. RFS2 promotes the use of advanced biofuel to be substituted partially for 
conventional ethanol by 2022.  
Recently substantial attention has been paid to biofuels in response to rising 
petroleum prices, renewable fuel mandates, GHG emission reduction desires, food 
versus fuel land competition, energy security desires and clean air activities, among 
other forces. Profitability of biofeedstock production in recent years has led to land use 
conversion from conventional crops and other uses. Replacing conventional crop lands 
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with crops produced for energy use reduces conventional production and leads to higher 
prices. Also since grains have been heavily used to feed animals, livestock products and 
prices are likely affected. This is commonly called a conflict between food and fuel 
production.  In addition, another outcome of using food crops for energy could be land 
replacement by conversion of land somewhere else through deforestation, which will 
also affect GHG emissions (Swinton et al. 2011; Searchinger et al. 2008).   
Use of marginal land, which is not currently used for growing food crops, could 
lessen the conflict between food and fuel production. Economists describe marginal land 
as a land at the extensive margin of production (Barlowe 1986). Tilman et al. (2006) 
found that low input production on poor quality land can yield biomass. Also some 
studies have focused on the possible use of marginal lands developing estimates of the 
input cost and yields when using them to grow biomass (Berndes 2002). 
The second essay of this thesis will analyze the economics of raising energy crops on 
marginal land.  Specifically, we will examine the potential contribution of switchgrass 
grown on marginal land in fulfilling the RFS2 requirements on advanced biofuels and 
how this is influenced by carbon market incentives. Also we will study the net 
greenhouse gas emission effects that arise as well. Finally, we will examine the effects 
on major commodity prices, consumers' surplus and producers' surplus. 
1.3 Agricultural Market Interrelationships with Energy 
Production of biofuels affects agricultural markets through diversion of land to 
produce biofeedstocks. This diversion in turn leads to a reduction in supply of other 
products and a likely rise in prices. Since ethanol is an oxygen enhancing additive and a 
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replacement for gasoline, its price has a relationship with gasoline and also crude oil. 
Moreover a rise in oil-based fuel prices increases production costs for crops and, in turn, 
their prices. Here we explore price interrelationships. 
In the third essay of this thesis we examine the dynamics and contemporaneous 
causality between agricultural and energy markets.  To do this, we model the energy–
agriculture linkage using a structural vector auto regression (VAR) model. This model 
lets us quantify the relative importance of various contributing factors as they effect 
prices in both markets. The Lingam algorithm from the machine learning literature is 
used to achieve identification of the structural parameters in contemporaneous time. We 
also perform conditional forecasting, taking into account the renewable fuel standard 
policies, and compare the forecasted path of prices with and without the renewable fuels 
mandates.  
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CHAPTER II  
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF VOLUNTARY AGRICULTURAL 
GREENHOUSE GAS OFFSET MARKET DESIGNS 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Agriculture is potentially a source of emission reductions and sequestration 
enhancements both of which can offset greenhouse gas emissions from other sectors. A 
number of studies indicate that the agricultural sector could make significant 
contributions in a societal climate change mitigation effort, thus would involve practices 
such as altering soil tillage, fossil fuel use, pesticide application, fertilization rates, rice 
management, bioenergy production and moving land to grass or forests (McCarl and 
Schneider 2000).  
A major component of greenhouse gas (GHG) policy has been cap and trade where 
emitters have a permitted maximum net emission level but can buy or sell emission 
permits. However, in most proposed policy the agricultural sector is not a capped sector 
– one that is subject to a permitted limit.  Rather agriculture is typically regarded as an 
offset supplying sector.  Namely, agriculture produces offsets where an offset is a 
reduction in GHG emissions or an increase in carbon sequestration created by an 
unregulated party that can be used to counterbalance emissions from a regulated party 
under the GHG emission cap (Murray et al. 2012). Such offsets could be sold into the 
GHG permit market if the agricultural entities are willing and allowed to participate.  
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In particular, the cap and trade scheme under the proposed, but never ratified, 
American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 (ACESA, or HR 2454) included 
agriculture and forestry efforts as offsets.  Some other policy proposals that include 
agriculture as an offset are: a) the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) in the 
Northeastern United States that caps emissions from the electric power sector and allows 
for offsets from other sectors and regions; b) the cap and trade system arising in 
California where agriculture will participate as an offset via farmland conservation and 
agricultural management strategies, and c) the European Union’s Emission Trading 
System (EU ETS). Strengthening the capacity of the forest and agricultural sectors to 
capture CO2, protect biodiversity, pursue more climate friendly agricultural practices and 
carry out mandatory accounting for grassland and cropland management are some of the 
actions allowed through EU ETS. 
Offsets are advocated by policy makers since they are outside of regulated sectors 
and reduce the atmospheric concentration of GHGs.  Consequently their inclusion helps 
reduce compliance cost, and gives time for regulated sectors to develop low cost 
strategies. The cost reduction from allowing offsets can be substantial. For example, 
analyses of recent federal U.S. cap and trade proposals indicate that the inclusion of 
offsets could reduce compliance cost by over 50% (Murray et al. 2012). Figure 1 
portrays the potential situation where the panel on the left depicts the capped sector and 
the one on the right is the offset market. The cap is the vertical line (Cap) for the capped 
sector and the marginal cost of emissions reduction is the positively sloped line labeled 
(MC-capped). With no offset market the price of abatement would be at Pcap. When 
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there is an offset market, the difference between the cap and the marginal cost of capped 
sector emissions reductions would be the excess demand facing the uncapped sector (D-
uncapped). In turn the tradable permit price will decrease to P* with offsets being 
purchased and the cap requirement being satisfied by reductions in the both the capped 
and uncapped, offset, sectors (A-CAP and A_uncap respectively).  
 
 
Figure 1. Offset markets decrease the overall compliance costs (Murray et al. 2012). 
 
Such a market reduces the overall cost of complying with the cap plus creates a 
stream of revenue (A-uncap* P*) to the offsetting sector (Pattanayak and Butry 2005).  
An offset program would bring uncapped sectors into GHG reduction programs 
voluntarily providing they are eligible.  
Agriculture and forestry (AF) could have been capped sectors but are not generally 
being considered so for several reasons. Some major reasons are transactions costs of 
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measuring, monitoring and enforcing limits on AF, that arise since the AF sectors 
consists of many entities most of which are small (Florida Farm Bureau Federation 
2009).  Also heterogeneous conditions across the landscape and time in the form of 
varying soil types, weather and crop mix can cause GHG emissions to differ so much 
that uniform rules, and protocols are not applicable (Florida Farm Bureau Federation 
2009).  Also AF are subject to problems in the forms of additionality, leakage, 
uncertainty and permanence (Chazournes and Boisson 1998). Each will be discussed 
below. 
 Additionality refers to a concern that credit buyers pay for GHGs that 100% offset 
global net emissions to the atmosphere.  In particular, in the international GHG 
regulatory discussion (Chazournes and Boisson 1998; Shrestha and Timilsina 2002),  
policymakers have reflected a desire to only credit GHG offsets that would not have 
occurred under the normal course of business (commonly called business as usual).  
Similarly, credit buyers would naturally desire to pay only for GHG offsets that they can 
claim credit for under regulatory schemes.  Thus, buyers would not wish to pay for 
potential offsets that someone would disallow.  The widely held stance arising is that the 
rulemaking and regulatory structure should only grant credits for GHG offsets that are 
additional to what would have occurred under business as usual.  
Since some GHG mitigating actions produce private net benefits for landowners and 
have historically been adopted under business as usual in the absence of a GHG offset 
program their use can be judged non additional.  Furthermore this adoption is often 
farmer’s private information and is not necessarily known to purchasers. This 
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information asymmetry means the purchaser cannot observe what the enrolled farmer 
would have done without the payment. The information asymmetry and the business as 
usual adoption is the source of the problem of additionality (Murray, Sohngen and Ross 
2007).  
Leakage constitutes another challenge to carbon offset policy designers (Chazournes 
and Boisson 1998; Metz 2001). Market forces coupled with less than global coverage by 
a GHG regulatory program can cause net GHG emission reductions within one region to 
be offset by increased emissions in other regions.  For example, suppose crop land use 
within a region is altered in the name of a GHG offset program resulting in increased 
sequestration, less emissions and less crop production.  But suppose, in turn, that there 
are crop land expansion reactions in other regions replacing the lost production leading 
to increased emissions in those regions. This implies that the global net emission 
reduction is less than would be implied by just looking at the regional effects of the 
program (Murray, McCarl and Lee 2004).  
Uncertainty is a third major challenge (Chazournes and Boisson 1998).  Land-use 
based production of GHG offsets will be subject to production and sampling uncertainty 
(Kim and McCarl 2009).  Production uncertainty arises from year-to-year weather 
variations along with the uncertain incidence of fire, diseases and pests coupled with 
many other factors (Heath and Smith 2000).   
Uncertainty also arises due to sampling issues.  Measurement of GHGs across the 
landscape is not possible due to the pervasiveness of carbon.  Collectively the natural 
production and sampling uncertainty will exist and thus the purchaser of potential GHG 
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offsets will be at risk of having the quantity of purchased offsets falling below the 
claimed level of offsets causing the purchaser to be out of compliance with regulatory 
limits.  
Permanence is another major issue that may be keeping AF mitigation in the offset 
category (Metz 2001).  The total quantity of potentially creditable GHG offsets 
generated by AF, particularly sequestration, projects cannot be guaranteed to be 
permanent because of potential reversal of practices or the potential incidence of 
uncontrollable events that would lead to release of the sequestered GHGs like a forest 
fire.  In addition differential annual amounts of GHG activities generally arise over time.   
This research examines AF sector participation in a voluntary carbon offset market 
and does an empirical study on the nature of contributions in terms of additionality and 
leakage. If a farmer chooses to join the program (opt in), she receives a GHG credit for 
her change in net emissions relative to the assigned baseline and is subject to liability for 
any future increases in emission. On the other hand, if the farmer chooses not to opt in, 
she will receive no payments and will not be subject to liability for increasing GHG 
emissions. In such optin procedures a key factor is likely the baseline establishment and 
payment eligibility procedures.  We will examine several baseline establishment and 
payment eligibility procedures and their effectiveness across alternative carbon 
equivalent prices to see what happens in terms of magnitude of participation rates plus 
will examine additionality and leakage implications. 
Herein we assume that agricultural producers can voluntarily opt in entering a carbon 
trading program as sellers of offsets. Participants that opt in receive a GHG credit for 
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sales plus pay for emissions increases. We also assume producers who do not opt in to 
the program, receive no payments and have no liabilities if they increase emissions. We 
assume the system is symmetric and that payments and penalties are charged at the same 
rate and this equals the carbon price.  
To do our empirical analysis we need to model the farmer’s voluntary decision as to 
whether to participate or not participate in the carbon offset crediting program (hereafter 
called opt in).  We will do this by simulating market participation using the Forest and 
Agriculture Sector Optimization Model-Green House Gas version (FASOM-GHG) (Lee 
et al. 2007; Beach and McCarl 2010). 
2.2 Brief Literature Review 
The Kyoto Protocol states that emission reductions from an offset market project 
should be “…. additional to any that would occur in the absence of such activities” 
(Chazournes and Boisson 1998). However, establishing a practical approach to insure 
additionality is difficult. Several studies propose using a screening contract method 
under the assumption of heterogeneous service providers to improve additionality 
(Ferraro 2008; Wu and Babcock 1995). Wu and Babcock (1996) use mechanism design 
(specifically a principal- agent model) to overcome information asymmetry between 
farmers and the government. Information asymmetry arises since the government knows 
only the distribution of farmers' production situations, rather than farm-specific 
information.  
Bushnell (2011) discussed adverse selection possibilities in the carbon offset markets 
since the regulator does not know the exact distribution of business as usual (BAU) 
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emissions amounts and some farmers can take advantage by mimicking high cost type 
farmers. Mason and Plantinga (2011) tried to solve the adverse selection problem in the 
presence of information asymmetries proposing use of an incentive-compatible 
principal-agent dynamic contract.  Mezzatesta et al. (2013) used propensity score 
matching methods to estimate the level of additionality from enrollment in cost-share 
programs for six conservation practices.  
2.2.1 Additionality and Baselines 
The problem of additionality is closely related to the establishment of the baseline. 
Ideally, an opt in offset producer receives sellable credits or direct payments for the 
difference between a baseline and their net emissions whenever these emissions fall 
below the baseline (Horowitz and Just 2013). Each field or farm can be assigned an 
emissions baseline that it must do better than in order to merit payments.    
Several studies have proposed that the payment scheme needs to be tailored to 
producer activities. Antle et al. (2003) argued that there would be greater efficiency 
using per-tonne offset contracts rather than practice based per-hectare contracts as do 
Murray and Baker (2011). 
 Fell and Morgenstern (2010) discuss uncertainty in baseline emissions and offset 
supply. Predicting the unobserved emissions baseline after program implementation is 
difficult, making the baseline estimates uncertain. Also, asymmetric information 
between the regulator and the offset entity complicates precise assignment of the 
baseline (Murray et al. 2012). Using a baseline to reduce non additionality is a popular 
method suggested in the literature. Horowitz and Just (2013) examine characteristics of 
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an optimal baseline in the context of a cap-and-trade scheme where the baseline is 
applied to a sector not covered by the cap but sells offsets to the capped sectors. With the 
objective of maximizing the surplus of both sectors minus damage to the environment, 
they find that it is desirable to set a low baseline. This finding is similar to the study on 
the voluntary opt-in component of the sulfur dioxide emission trading program in 
(Montero 2000). This study favors a low baseline, which allows payments for non-
additional production raises the costs of achieving a given level of additional offsets. 
Essentially, a low baseline allows all the low cost abatement opportunities to participate 
and at the same time the non additional credit producers receive large windfall profits 
from the credit buyer. This turns out to be efficient because the transfer does not affect 
the objective, which considers only the total welfare. Our study will focus on baseline 
determination. 
2.2.2 Leakage 
Practicing GHG mitigation policies in one country can cause additional production 
and consequently emission rise in another country which called international leakage. 
The basic argument is that regulation in one country may shift production to other 
countries (Pethig 1976) and that could cause GHG emissions to increase too.   There are 
some energy related studies in the literature that consider the effects of mitigation 
policies such as carbon tax, tradable permits in one country on potential leakage in the 
rest of world (Bernstein, Montgomery and Rutherford 1999).  
Babkier (2005) estimates the potential international leakage in an energy context at 
130% because of reallocation of energy intensive industries away from OECD countries. 
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On the other hand, Barker et al. (2007) investigate the potential carbon leakage from six 
EU Member States which implemented environmental tax reform and find small leakage 
effects. Lee et al.(2007) studied the likely effects of agricultural emission abatement on 
non- host countries. They found that at a $100 price total U.S. production falls by 2.5% 
and traded production falls by 6.5% but that production in non-U.S. Annex B and non-
Annex B countries grew by 2.66% and 12.22% correspondingly. Rise in production of 
other countries results from comparative advantage shifts and indicates that leakage 
would happen. 
2.3 Baseline and Participation Alternatives 
Today a main issue in designing carbon offset market is assignment of an applicable 
baseline which removes non additionality at the lowest transaction cost. Also the 
baseline in a voluntary program must treat individual producers and not the sector as a 
whole, thus the baseline must be scalable applying equally to a range of participants 
from few optin producers to many.  For this reason we examine per unit optin baselines 
(per acre for crops, per animal for livestock, per gallon for biofuel, per btu for biopower) 
and compare their efficiency with the programs with no baseline and a perfect baseline.  
To define a per unit baseline, we calculate the per unit amount of GHG emissions 
produced in different categories of agricultural activities, such as cropping, livestock 
management, grazing and bioenergy. We will also develop a hybrid baseline that is 
largely the same as a per unit one, but has alternative features for previously unused 
strategies like biopower.   
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From the standpoint of controlling additionality and leakage the ideal scheme is one 
of full coverage where all are liable for emissions plus all are rewarded for emissions 
reductions.  However, this is not generally going to be possible for a non-capped, 
offsetting sector. Rather than one needs to examine voluntary participation.   
In our examination of voluntary participation we specify several baseline 
alternatives.  These are motivated by several concerns and assumptions. 
 One wishes the offsets generated to be additional to what would have happened 
in the absence of the program. 
 One is dealing with opt in participants and non participants and the baseline 
must be able to cover a variable number of opt in participants - being scalable. 
 One can broadly observe practices before the program in regions so has an idea 
of typical patterns of emissions by producer groups as well as total emissions. 
 Some of the potential producer groups are already using potential emission 
mitigating strategies while other strategies may not being used at meaningful 
levels (i.e. afforestation and bioenergy may be acting at much lower levels than 
possible) 
To guide this discussion consider the following simple model including an objective 
function and the constraints: 
                                                                 (1) 
                                                                                                      (2) 
                                                                                                             (3) 
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                                                                                                            (4) 
Where pr is the agricultural product prices, p identifies opt in participants, np 
identifies non participants, f the production function for both types of participants, X is 
activity level, O is offset strategies used, c is a cost function for the participants, op is the 
offset price, OIO is offsets from opted in participants, i is resources, ru is a resource use 
function, b is resource endowment, NOIO is net offsets from non-participants that are 
not eligible for payments. Also ne is a function that gives net emission consequences of 
producing X while using offset strategy O. 
Below are some participation and baseline issues.   
1) The no program, base scenario will simulate the case in which there is no carbon 
crediting program and hence, the carbon price is zero. This gives us the emission 
produced in a baseline without any program that encourages agriculture sector to 
offset carbon. If the model above is solved with op=0 then one gets a base 
solution with the optimal levels     and      .  This will be the BASE 
scenario in the analysis below. 
2) The "mandatory" scenario with a total sector baseline in which case the 
agriculture sector is entirely covered by the offset program and is paid for offsets 
but also incurs liabilities if emissions increase. Therefore the objective function is 
replaced with  
                                                  
                                                                                       (5)                                             
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also when the model is solved with op>0 then one gets a solution that indicates 
the amount of offsets produced when the entire sector is capped and they are paid 
only for offsets above the baseline plus penalized for offsets below the baseline. 
This will be called the full coverage baseline or mandatory scenario below. 
3) The "zero baseline" scenario represents a voluntary carbon crediting program but 
without a baseline. In that case the opt in participants will get paid if they reduce 
carbon emissions and will incur liabilities for emission increases. Also producers 
that do not optin do not receive payments or liabilities.  Such a scenario is likely 
to have additionality and adverse selection issues. All farmers can claim for 
additional GHG mitigation, but because of hidden information the truth will be 
unknown to the buyer. In the real world this scenario will be simple to administer 
but it is not efficient as non additional producers are getting paid too. If the model 
above (equation 1-4) is solved with op>0 then one gets a solution that indicates 
the amount of offsets produced when opting in with a zero baseline i.e. they get 
paid for all offsets.  
4) The optin-perfect baseline scenario involves a "perfect baseline" where optin 
producers are only paid for better performance compared to the no program base 
situation. This scenario captures both additionality (actual reductions relative to 
what would have happened without crediting) and leakage (increases in non-
participant emissions outside the program). If the model above has a new variable 
added for the amount of optin carbon paid for (POIO) and one adds a constraint 
limiting payments to be less than amount of opted in offsets plus another limiting 
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payments to be less than or equal to the additional offsets considering these from 
participants and no-participants minus the baseline levels as follows  
                                                                                                                     (6) 
                                                                                       (7) 
In turn one modifies the objective function to pay those that are truly additional 
and solves for       
                                                            (8)   
This generates the participating offset quantity paid for under a perfect baseline.  
This would be quite difficult to implement given the information needs to specify 
the baseline quantities plus the limit imposed on participating volumes related to 
non participants.  This will be called the perfect baseline scenario below. 
5) In setting up the "per unit" baseline the basic concept is to take activities that 
create greenhouse gas emissions and offsets and subtract the per unit rates from 
the baseline (per acre for crops, per animal for livestock, per ton of the forest 
product, per unit of bioenergy produced).  In the modeling case this would be the 
emissions found when the base model was solved. This renders the amount of 
emissions offset or added sequestration being paid for to be the amount that arises 
under the scenario per unit minus the baseline rate per unit. In  turn we compute  
baseline offset rates for: 
 cropping on an average acre basis  
 bioenergy on a gallon of fuel or btu of electricity basis  
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 livestock enteric fermentation on a per animal basis  
 livestock manure on a per animal in a manure treatment system basis 
 afforestation on a per acre afforested basis  
 forest management on a per acre managed basis 
 deforestation management on a per acre deforested basis 
For example to calculate the per unit baseline for crop production, we need to 
figure out the regional amount of emissions from different categories of GHG net 
emission related to this activity, such as soil sequestration, fuel, fertilizer and 
pesticide use, irrigation, and so on, for all of the regional acres of each crop using 
common practices in the region. All the GHG types are converted to the CO2 
equivalent through GWP. Then we need to divide the total amount of emissions 
by the amount of crop acres to get the per acre emission baseline rate.  
In our simplified algebraic model this would be the average amount of offsets 
divided by the units of X produced, such as: 
                       
      
                                                                    (9) 
Where the superscript b identifies the base levels of offsets and production.  
In turn one then modifies the equation (3) above to become 
                                                                                              (10) 
Subsequently one solves for op>0.  This formulation modifies OIO so that it is 
difference between the emissions from Xp and the average per unit (say per acre) 
amount (Bne) generated under the baseline condition.  This gives producers an 
incentive to do better than say the average current per unit offset rate in the 
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region.  This generates a scalable baseline and would not be extremely difficult to 
implement where one needs to compute the average offsets per unit activity.  This 
will be called the per unit baseline scenario below. 
6) It is likely that some GHG offset strategy possibilities will be used in very low 
quantities and may not really have ways to improve them in terms of GHG net 
offsets.  Such a case arises in practice with afforestation and bioelectricity where 
the baseline quantities are small. Moreover for both it is possible that the nep 
(Xp,Op) when implemented could be quite close to Bne providing it could be 
calculated (ie if Xp +Xnp is not zero).  In turn, this would mean that under the per 
unit baseline there would be no incentive to bring such activities into use (i.e. if 
nep (Xp,Op)/Xp= Bne). To correct for this we partition the Xp terms into terms that 
are operating at "reasonable" non zero levels (Xpr) and those that are 
"unreasonably small" (Xps).  We will also use the per unit baseline approach for 
Xpr but a perfect baseline approach for Xps as follows: 
                                                                                         
                                                                                 (11) 
                                                                                   (12) 
                                                                                          (13) 
                                                                                                        (14) 
                   ,                                                                                      (15) 
                  
                                                                                        (16) 
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Where POIOps is the amount of offsets paid for that were created by opt in 
producers for the small category of offsets and     
  is the amount of those items 
in the baseline. This gives producers of the "reasonable" non zero level 
opportunities (Xpr) an incentive to do better than  the average current per unit 
offsets in a region while giving producers of those that are "unreasonably small" 
(Xps) an incentive to move beyond the total amount in the baseline. This will be 
called the hybrid baseline scenario below.   
Note another approach could also be used where one computes the small 
amount of offsets by the total potential activity levels  
              
         
                                                                       (17)      
Thus if there was a small amount of afforestation in an areas (say 1,000 
acres) relative to the afforestation potential (say it is judged to be 10 million 
acres) then one could take the total base offset amount from the 1,000 acres and 
divide it by 10 million making the per acre amount 1/100,000 smaller and use 
this as the per acre Bne amount.  This is not investigated herein as we don’t have 
estimates of regional potential for bioenergy and afforestation. 
 2.4 Structure of FASOM-GHG Model 
The modeling approach used in this study is based on the Forest and Agricultural 
Sector Optimization Model (FASOMGHG) that has been used in the EPA RFS analysis 
(EPA 2009; Beach and McCarl 2010; Beach et al. 2010) plus in prior carbon market 
studies (Lee, McCarl and Gillig 2005; Murray, McCarl and Lee 2004) . It is also an 
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extension of the ASMGHG agriculture only GHG model (Schneider and McCarl 2003).  
FASOMGHG is a dynamic, nonlinear programming model of the US forest and 
agricultural sectors(Lee 2002; Adams et al. 2005; Beach et al. 2010).It is an inter 
temporal optimizing model that simulates behavior in the agricultural and forestry 
products market and land in response to market forces. The objective function of this 
dynamic optimization is to maximize the net present value of the sum of producers’ and 
consumers’ surplus across the agriculture and forestry sectors over the planning horizon 
while all the markets are at perfectly competitive market equilibrium. Commodities and 
factor prices are endogenous, determined by the supply and demand relationships in all 
markets included within the model.  The constraints of the model includes crop and 
livestock mixes; resource limits for land, water, and labor; balances on primary, 
secondary, and blended feed commodities; trade balances; and GHG balances.  This 
model structure simulates market equilibria under perfect competition in the product and 
factor markets and thus simulates what would happen under the alternative offset 
programs.    
The GHG payment is dedicated to those net GHG reductions above the baselines 
from agriculture, including sequestration activity. To calculate for the gain in GHG 
under a model scenario, we need to subtract off the baseline from the GHG offset. 
Different GHG price signals, mitigation policy, production possibilities, and 
management can lead to different GHG reduction activities. Due to net change in GHG 
computed by the account-specific GHG balance equations, the payments can be either 
positive or negative. The GHG amounts reflect emission activity, sequestration activity, 
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and biofuel related offset activities. The GHG prices will be exogenous to the 
agricultural sectors and it is a fixed GHG price on a carbon equivalent basis. This is a 
reasonable assumption given that approximately 84% of US GHG emissions arise in the 
energy sector, so it is clear the energy sector will play the primary role in carbon price 
determination (Adams et al. 2005). To do an opt in analysis, the FASOM-GHG model 
was modified to allow agricultural producers to voluntarily enter a carbon crediting 
program. The objective functions and constraints are adapted under each scenario.  
FASOMGHG quantifies the GHG emission stocks produced and sequestered by 
agriculture and forestry.  Also, the GHG emission reductions in other sectors caused by 
mitigation actions in agriculture sector could be followed by FASOM. The GHGs that 
are counted in the model are: CO2, CH4, and N2O. Since some of the agriculture 
activities have multi-GHG impact, we need to do multidimensional trade-offs between 
model variables and net GHG emissions. 100-year global warming potential (GWP) 
values, helps us with this trade-offs in the model. All the GHGs are converted to carbon 
dioxide equivalent. FASOMGHG model uses the IPCC GWPs for the GHGs as follows:  
 CO2 = 1  CH4 = 21  N2O = 310 
Major categories of GHG mitigation strategies included in FASOMGHG is listed in 
Table 1, along with the GHGs directly affected by each. 
To calculate the per acre scenario, we have defined different baselines categories 
regarding specific activities in agricultural sector. To calculate these baselines all types 
of GHG emission emerging from each activity has been taken into account. Here are the 
GHG accounts that have been considered in this study: 
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Baseline_agtill Baseline offset from tillage 
Baseline_crop                          Baseline offset from crop production 
Baseline_croptopastchange           Baseline offset from crop to pasture land use change 
Baseline_cropfrompastchange      Baseline offset from pasture to crop land use change 
Baseline_foresttocropchange        Baseline offset from forest to crop land use change 
Baseline_forestfromcropchange      Baseline offset from crop to forest land use change 
Baseline_bioenergy                          Baseline offset from bio energy 
Baseline_enteric                               Baseline offset from enteric fermentation 
Baseline_manure                              Baseline offset from manure 
Baseline_bioenergypen                    Baseline offset from bio energy penetration 
Baseline_idlepasture                        Baseline offset from idle pasture 
Baseline_pasturelandusechange       Baseline offset from pasture land use 
Baseline_grazinguse                         Baseline offset from grazing land use 
    
For instance to calculate baseline_crop, all net emissions related to crop will be taken 
into accounts.  This includes carbon dioxide from soil sequestration, diesel use, grain 
drying, irrigation pumping, and histosols coupled with the nitrous oxide from 
fertilization plus a few other cases. Notice in this case each one of these GHG is 
multiplied by its GWP to convert it into a carbon dioxide equivalent measure. Also to 
calculate the unit, we need to add up all the cropped acreage in the solution of base case 
for a crop. The per acre baseline then is calculated by dividing total GHG from cropping 
by total crop units. 
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Table 1 GHG mitigation strategies 
  GHG Affected 
Source/Sink Mitigation Strategy CO2 CH4 N2O 
Forestry     
Afforestation Sequestration X   
Reforestation Sequestration X   
Timberland management Sequestration X   
Harvested wood products Sequestration X   
Agriculture    
Manure management Emission  X X 
Crop mix alteration  
Emission, 
sequestration  
X  X 
Crop fertilization alteration 
Emission, 
sequestration  
X  X 
Crop input alteration Emission X  X 
Crop tillage alteration 
Emission, 
sequestration  
X  X 
Grassland conversion  Sequestration X   
Irrigated/dry land conversion Emission X  X 
Rice acreage Emission X X X 
Enteric fermentation Emission  X  
Livestock system change Emission  X X 
Livestock herd size Emission  X X 
Bioenergy    
Conventional ethanol Fossil fuel substitution X X X 
Cellulosic ethanol Fossil fuel substitution X X X 
Biodiesel Fossil fuel substitution X X X 
Bioelectricity Fossil fuel substitution X X X 
*Source: (Adams et al. 2005).  
 
In the hybrid scenario the bioenergy baseline is defined only in terms of the 
processing regarding amount of bioenergy production in gallons of fuel or BTU of 
bioelectricity and we force it to use crops from opt in production. The bioenergy forms 
modeled are  
 Biofeedstock for electricity generation from energy crops such as switchgrass, 
willow and hybrid poplar also it could be from milling residues, or forest logs.  
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 Biofeedstock for conventional and cellulosic ethanol produced from corn, 
switchgrass or other agricultural energy crops.  
 Biofeedstock for biodiesel.  
In a mitigation practice if the final emission is less than the baseline’s emission and 
the sequestration is more than baseline’ sequestration then pursuing that GHG mitigation 
leads to doing better than in baseline. 
 2.5 Results 
We start running a zero baseline scenario and show non additionality and leakage 
effects of no baseline in the model. We then present the additionality gained by using per 
unit and hybrid scenario. We also compare participation rate and leakage changes for 
carbon equivalent price variations. Marginal cost of zero, perfect, per unit and hybrid 
baselines are also presented. At the end we show market and welfare effects and also 
international leakage under per unit and hybrid scenarios.  
2.5.1 Additional GHG Abatement and Baseline Approaches 
A major issue regarding voluntary offset program is to study its effectiveness in 
reaching the environmental aims compare to the business as usual case (Ferraro and 
Pattanayak 2006). In the other words, the program designers are seeking additional 
improvement regarding GHG offsets. One likely element of causing non additionality is 
that participants of the program have been mitigating in the absence of any program. The 
other elements of non additionality relates to non-participants in the program. The 
overall additionality of the program is not just the amount that the participants would 
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add to GHG abatement, since emission could increase by those who are not enrolled in 
the program (Segerson 2013). This is a source of leakage.  
To address concerns about additionality including this non participant leakage; we 
present offsets by participant, emission by non-participants (leakage) and net GHG 
offset (additional amount) in a voluntary program with a zero baseline in Figure 2 for a 
range of carbon equivalent prices. As this figure is displaying, the additional offset is 
lower than what participants claim since part of it is reduced by increased emissions 
from non-participants out of the program. As a result, the payment to participants for 
GHG abatements is much higher than what is truly additional and this is not cost 
effective. Thus a baseline is needed. 
Including a non zero baseline in the voluntary carbon offset program can help the 
policy designer to make a more effective program. Here the baseline will be calculated 
under no program situation and we will pursue different means of subtracting the “what 
would have occurred amount” from GHG abatements produced by participants. In this 
study, as we explained before we simulated our model and compare the results of 
scenarios under perfect, per unit and hybrid baselines. 
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Figure 2. Presenting non additionality concern in a voluntary program. 
 
Implementing the perfect baseline to account for full additionality, in the real world 
would be very demanding given the information required to compute credits. But it is an 
informative scenario in our study, since it provides the best case outcome.  
In Figure 3, we present results on the additional offsets and the offsets by 
participants under each baseline at 30 $ CO2e. Additional offsets are calculated by 
computing participants’ offsets minus non participants’ emissions as they differ from the 
base case (no program). As one can see in Figure 3, by including baseline in per unit and 
hybrid scenarios we gain more additionality. As one can see the amount of non 
additional offsets paid for is highest under the zero baseline case and is lowest under the 
perfect baseline.  
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Figure 3. Additionality gained by including baseline in the program design. 
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higher CO2e prices, and that is the reason for the increasing abatement rate at higher CO2 
prices. At lower carbon prices low cost strategies such as change in tillage practice, 
fertilizer application, diet and manure management, which are more consistent with 
existing production are used and higher carbon prices shift the mitigation activities to 
forestry and biofuels (McCarl and Schneider 2001).   
For lower CO2e prices the participation rate for GHG abatement in the per unit 
scenario is higher or very close to the abatement under the perfect baseline. For instance 
at 12$ CO2e, the abatement under the per unit baseline is about 4.5 times more than that 
under the perfect baseline. But this ratio changes for the prices higher than 30 $ CO2e, 
with the per unit amount being 16% less than that the perfect baseline at a 100 $ CO2e 
price. This is largely because the bioenergy possibilities are not being pursued because 
of the closeness of the per unit baseline to the potential amount and the fact that this does 
not allow expansions in scale (as discussed under the formation of the hybrid baseline 
above). The hybrid baseline scenario alters this and shows offset levels close to the 
perfect baseline. 
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Figure 4. Annual GHG offset by participants in each program changing with CO2e prices. 
 
The relative reduction in total GHG offset from the no program (base) is compared 
among the scenarios in Table 2. For instance at 30 $ CO2e the level of overall GHG 
offset under the mandatory program is about 1.5 times higher than that under the per unit 
baseline program. Although the mandatory program generates the maximum GHG 
mitigation potentials in agriculture sector, there are arguments against mandatory carbon 
offset programs in agriculture due to food security and property rights issues plus 
virtually all discussion today involves voluntary participation.  
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Table 2 Relative change from base for total GHG annual reduction in million tons CO2 equivalent. 
Carbon Price 
(CO2e) mandatory  
optin-zero 
baseline 
optin-perfect 
baseline 
optin-per unit 
baseline 
optin-hybrid 
baseline 
30 0.285 0.215 0.199 0.166 0.187 
50 1.228 0.422 0.49 0.2 0.481 
100 1.557 0.687 0.584 0.475 0.654 
 
      Higher Carbon prices reduce non additionality through reduction of non participant 
leakage. The relationship between carbon price and non participant leakage is presented 
in the Figure 5 for the per unit and hybrid baselines and also for the zero baseline 
scenario. Higher carbon prices create more participation incentives, and so the scale of 
optin offset is larger and the leakage effect is smaller (Murray, McCarl and Lee 2004) as 
one can see in Figure 5. The leakage decreases the stricter the baseline.  
 
 
Figure 5. Leakage effects as a function of carbon price. 
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2.5.3 Marginal Cost of GHG Offset 
We compute the “program marginal cost” in each scenario using an annualization 
approach described by Richards and Stokes (2004) and Im et al. (2007). Program 
marginal cost is calculated as the difference in annualized net carbon payment divided 
by additional annualized carbon offset for each carbon price increment (Im et al. (2007) ; 
Latta et al. 2010). The carbon payment in this study goes to the offsets produced by 
those who participate in the program. But the amount of offset we consider in the 
calculation is only the additional ones to the base case.  
 
 
Figure 6. Program marginal cost of additional offset. 
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  Figure 6 presents the program marginal cost under each baseline scenario in this 
study computed across alternative offset prices. The marginal cost of program in the zero 
baseline case is higher than that under the perfect baseline. That is because the payment 
to the non-additional producers is eliminated in the perfect baseline so the program cost 
decreases. The per unit baseline scenario’s marginal cost is below the perfect baseline 
scenario’s marginal cost when the carbon price is around 30$ CO2e. Also for more than 
15 billion tons offset per year, the marginal cost of per unit baseline scenario would 
grow higher than no baseline case. The reason is lack of incentives for biofuel related 
mitigation activities at per unit baseline and thus other more expensive alternatives are 
used at higher carbon prices. Therefore the rate of claimed offset to additional offset gets 
higher for per unit scenario compare to no baseline scenario. The marginal cost of hybrid 
baseline is less than no baseline and it is close to perfect baseline at all the prices and 
offset ranges since it makes more incentives for biofuel production and more additional 
offset is happening. 
The comparison of total program cost between per unit and hybrid scenario is also 
presented in Figure 7. As one can see in Figure 7, the program cost in hybrid scenario is 
less than that under the per unit baseline, since the hybrid scenario allows growth in the 
bioenergy category and makes the offset program more efficient (higher relative 
additionality).  
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Figure 7. Total program cost of additional offset for per unit and hybrid baseline scenarios. 
 
2.5.4  Market Effects 
Large scale mitigation efforts in US agriculture are likely to decrease traditional 
agricultural production and therefore increase related commodity prices and land values 
(Schneider and McCarl 2003). The fisher index price of farm product and processed 
product is showing relative rise of 0.54 and 0.60 from base respectively in per unit 
scenario for 50 $CO2e by the year 2025. Also the farm production and processed 
commodity production decrease 0.58, 0.50 from base case in this scenario. The fisher 
price and production indices are reported in Table 3.  
As Schneider and McCarl 2003 discussed, the effect of carbon prices on emission 
intensive technologies provide incentives for alternatives makes farmers to shift more 
land to mitigation strategies and reduce production.  The results of our estimation of US 
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export of farm product shows 0.41 relative decrease with respect to the base case in per 
unit scenario by the year 2025.  
 2.5.5 Welfare Distribution  
Agricultural welfare impacts of the per unit baseline with respect to carbon 
equivalent prices are shown in Figure 8. Consumers’ welfare decreases slightly because 
of higher commodity prices. On the other hand, producers’ welfare increases as emission 
reduction is now a source of income and the abatement adds to welfare (Schneider and 
McCarl 2003).  Less agricultural production and higher prices cause the producer’s 
surplus to increase. The rate of growth in producers’ welfare increases at higher CO2e 
prices. The surplus discussed here does not cover the social cost and benefits of 
externalities such as the value of GHG emission reduction or changes in erosion. 
 Also foreign welfare; which is the sum over foreign consumers and producers 
welfare is slightly decreasing. Foreign consumers would be worse off because of less US 
export and higher commodity prices, but foreign producers would gain advantage due to 
less US export. In total the loss in foreign consumers’ welfare exceeds the gain in 
foreign producers’ surplus. Also the total welfare in agriculture sector is increasing since 
the increase in producer’s welfare offsets the losses in consumers and foreign welfare.  
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Figure 8. Annual welfare distribution in per unit scenario. 
 
We have also presented results on the comparison of consumers’, producers’ and 
foreign welfare under the per unit and hybrid baseline scenarios in Figure 9. The 
consumer’s welfare decreases under the hybrid scenario because of higher prices at 
higher carbon prices compared to the per unit baseline caused by the greater amount of 
bioenergy production.  
Also the production will decrease in the hybrid scenario compare to per unit baseline 
scenario. One can compare national production, price and export price of farm products 
and processed commodities between two scenarios at Table 3. In addition, lower export 
from US causes the foreign welfare to decrease as presented in the Figure 8 and Figure 
9.  
-0.05 
0 
0.05 
0.1 
0.15 
0.2 
0.25 
0.3 
0.35 
0.4 
0.45 
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 
P
er
ce
n
t 
w
el
fa
re
 C
h
an
ge
 (
m
ill
 $
) 
$ US per ton CO2e 
dom_demand per acre 
producer per acre 
foreign per acre 
 40 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Comparison of welfare change in per unit and hybrid scenarios. 
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Table 3 Production, Price and Export Index comparison in per unit and hybrid baseline scenarios at 
2025. 
National 
Index   
Per unit 
baseline  
Hybrid 
baseline 
Per unit 
baseline  
Hybrid 
baseline 
  
50 $ CO2e 100 $ CO2e 
All Farm Production 
 
-0.58 -2.37 -1.82 -3.57 
All Farm Price 
 
0.54 2.31 1.77 2.43 
All Farm Export 
 
-1.61 -3.35 -2.34 -5.2 
       All Processed Production -0.05 -0.31 -0.28 -0.46 
All Processed Price 
 
0.6 2.48 2.44 3.71 
All Processed Export -0.8 -4.37 -4.24 -6.89 
       Livestock Production 0.19 -0.13 0.2 0.05 
Livestock Price 
 
0.03 0.69 0.16 1.87 
 
2.5.6 International Leakage 
GHG mitigation policies in one country can cause additional production and 
consequently emission increases in another country which called international leakage. 
Regulation in one country may shift production to other countries because of a shift in 
comparative advantage. In this work we also study the effects of US voluntary carbon 
offset market on international production and from that infer leakage. For this reason we 
present the export and price index of some selected countries such as NC-Euro, West 
Africa, China and Brazil in Table 4 and Table 5.  Table 4 presents the comparison of the 
export and price indices for an optin program with a zero baseline and the per unit 
baseline at 50 $ CO2e. The results indicate less increase in the export and price index in 
all countries except for the Euro region under the per unit baseline compared to the zero 
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baseline case. This means that under the per unit baseline international leakage is likely 
to be less compared to the zero baseline case. Increase in export of a country shows 
higher production in those countries and as a result portends higher GHG emissions. 
 
Table 4 Annual percent change from base in export quantity and price change under different 
baseline scenarios at 50 $ CO2e. 
 No baseline Per unit 
 Export price Export price 
NC-Euro -0.0400 0.8000 0.2400 1.9500 
W-Africa 0.9100 1.9300 0.2500 0.4100 
China 11.7600 4.2800 1.9200 0.5300 
Brazil 0.4700  1.5600 0.1800 0.4800 
 
 
Table 5 Annual percent change from base in export price and quantity in per unit and hybrid 
baseline scenarios. 
 30$ CO2e 100$CO2e 
 Export price Export price 
Optin per unit baseline scenario: 
NC-Euro 0.26 2.15 -0.27 0.20 
W-Africa 0.07 0.00 0.91 2.03 
China 0.08 -0.11 12.49 4.88 
Brazil 0.42 0.00 0.60 2.20 
Optin hybrid baseline scenario: 
NC-Euro 0.56 2.05 0.20 -4.49 
W-Africa 0.00 0.07 -0.66 2.39 
China 0.59 0.21 17.61 8.78 
Brazil 0.18 0.45 1.17 3.59 
 
Also the international leakage is compared for two carbon prices under the per unit 
and hybrid baseline cases in Table 5.   Price and Export index shows an increase as the 
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carbon price rise except for the region NC-Euro. The reason could be less US production 
plus fewer exports from US to other countries at higher carbon prices (as one can see in 
Figure 3). Also the international leakage in hybrid baseline is larger at higher carbon 
prices again due to higher bioenergy production and more diverted conventional 
production, as one can compare the results of 30 and 100 $ CO2 in Table 5.  
2.6 Conclusions 
Here we examined alternative designs for agricultural participation in a voluntary 
GHG mitigation trading scheme.  Examining the consequences of alternative baselines 
for participation we find the baseline specification is very important relative to program 
cost and additionality.  In particular, when producers are able to opt in with a zero 
baseline, we find the highest participation rates, but the smallest amount of additional 
offsets because of countervailing actions by non-opted in producers plus the 
participation of many with non additional, business as usual, practices. This occurs since 
there is no baseline that eliminates market entry by business as usual, non-additional 
participants.  Thus the volume of claimed offsets is high but the additional amount is low 
with much paid to non-additional producers. Therefore we conclude that a baseline is 
essential.  
In turn we examine the consequences of alternative baseline cases measuring their 
effectiveness in terms of additionality, leakage and program cost.  First we introduce a 
perfect baseline scenario paying only for GHG mitigation above the levels in the 
baseline which embodies a strong assumption of no hidden information that prohibits 
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non additional offsets from entering the program. While this generates the most 
additionality among the optin cases we believe it is virtually impossible to implement.  
Second we suggest a per unit baseline where we assign all mitigation activities on a 
per acre or per animal or per unit bioenergy produced GHG amount that they must do 
better than in order to be paid.  We find this baseline works well but generates 
substantially less offsets at higher prices due to its discriminatory effects against 
bioenergy alternatives that are little used in the baseline case.  In particular we find the 
per unit baseline works best when the units of the potential implementation are 
essentially equal to their without carbon price levels - when the acres are all farmed or 
animals produced.  However this does not do well when the per unit emissions are close 
to the baseline per unit amount and the volume produced is small.  In that case the 
incentive to do better than the baseline per unit amount distorts the incentive to vastly 
expand the units produced above the baseline levels.  
Thus we introduced a hybrid baseline where for the strategies with small unit levels 
in the base situation need to do better than the total offset in the base model.  In that case 
substantially more offsets are realized with a smaller program marginal cost.   
The results of this study shows that when moving away from a mandatory program a 
scalable per unit baseline is critical  with adjustments for items one wishes to allow to 
expand in scale. 
In this study we have also considered the effect of voluntary carbon offset market 
with per unit and hybrid baselines on price, production and export indices for US. The 
results showed a rise in agricultural prices and a fall in production and export of farm 
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and processed commodities. Encouraging mitigation efforts through carbon offset 
markets in US agriculture is likely to decrease traditional agricultural production and 
therefore increase related commodity prices and land values.  Higher commodity prices 
and less production lead to lower consumers and higher producers’ surplus. Less exports 
from US to other countries also causes the overall foreign surplus to decrease. Since 
biofuel is more encouraged under hybrid baseline, producers’ surplus is higher than in 
per unit baseline scenario.  
Studying price and export indices of some selected countries helps in appraising 
whether there might be an increase in international leakage if a voluntary carbon offset 
program is implemented. Results showed that using a per unit baseline in the voluntary 
programs decreases the international leakage. Also at higher carbon equivalent prices the 
international leakage is higher except for NC- Euro.  
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CHAPTER III  
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF GROWING SWITCHGRASS ON 
MARGINAL LAND 
 
3.1  Introduction 
Energy independence, reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and rural economy 
enhancement are some of the main reasons for promoting biofuel production in the US. 
The biofuel requirements under the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, also 
called RFS2, mandates increasing the biofuel volume to 36 billion gallons by 2022, of 
which 16 billion gallons will be cellulosic biofuel (Renewable Fuels Standard 
Association, 2012).  
Producing biofuel and devoting cropland to biofeedstock production raises the 
challenging discussion of food versus feed involving diverted land, reduced conventional 
production, and accompanying price rises. Researchers raise two main concerns to the 
renewable fuel mandates. First, the reduction of cropland devoted to food and feed 
production lowers aggregate production and leads to higher food prices (Runge and 
Senauer 2007).  Second concern that the resultant higher food prices causes development 
of lands elsewhere with possible deforestation and associated GHG emissions 
(Searchinger et al. 2008; Fargione et al. 2008).  
The primary feedstock for US ethanol production is maize or corn (Zea mays) grain 
and also sorghum (Sorghum bicolor), but the RFS2 imposes a maximum amount on 
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ethanol from such sources.  This coupled with competing feed and food demands for 
grain supplies leads attention to ligno cellulosic biofeedstocks (Schmer et al. 2008) such 
as switchgrass, crop residues, and woody biomass (Philp, Guy and Ritchie 2013). 
Cellulosic biofuels can also achieve higher GHG emission reduction compared to 
conventional biofuel (almost 3 times) (Renewable Fuel Association). 
Recently feedstock production on marginal lands has been the subject of increased 
attention by bioenergy producers and policy makers. Milbrandt et al. (2014) defines 
marginal land as land with inherent disadvantages or lands marginalized by natural or 
artificial forces (or both). This type of land usually has low economic value due to its 
low productivity or high cost to cultivate. In the literature, this type of land has been 
called low-quality land as well. Using marginal land instead of cropland to produce 
cellulosic biofuel may overcome some of the fuel versus food-feed criticism of RFS we 
discussed before.   
In this study we will examine the economic implications of growing switchgrass 
(Panicum virgatum L.) on marginal land under RFS requirements. Key 
agronomic advantages of switchgrass as a bioenergy crop are its stand longevity, 
relatively low herbicide and fertilizer input requirements, drought and flood tolerance,  
ease of supervision, hardiness in poor soil and climate conditions, and widespread 
adaptability in temperate climates (McLaughlin and Adams Kszos 2005). Switchgrass is 
a perennial that once planted lasts 10 years or more, but can be harvested every year by 
conventional hay equipment (Jensen et al. 2007). Furthermore switchgrass can relatively 
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produce high yield on marginal land plus it needs less fertilizer and pesticides, and helps 
in emission reduction of both water and GHGs (Robertson et al. 2011). 
Switchgrass as a biofeedstocks can be used in production of energy following several 
different methods. It can be used to produce cellulosic ethanol which is more efficient 
than grain based ethanol through a process of fermentation. Also it can be used alone or 
cofired with coal or other fossil fuels to produce heat or electricity; and it can be used to 
produce ethanol or other synthetic biofuels through gasification or pyrolysis (Jensen et 
al. 2007). 
This research analyzes the economic implications and cost competiveness of 
growing switchgrass on marginal land. We will simulate the amount of switchgrass that 
is produced on marginal land under RFS2 and compare the production patterns and 
market conditions with and without using marginal land under alternative carbon prices.  
To do this we will use the Forest and Agricultural Sector Optimization Model GHG 
version (FASOM- GHG) (Beach and McCarl 2010; Adams et al. 2005). 
Specifically we will examine how use versus non use of marginal land in the form of 
the USDA land classification cropland pasture can contribute to fulfilling the RFS2 
cellulosic biofuels requirements, under carbon prices of zero, 5, and 30 $per ton CO2e.  
Moreover, we will examine the change in GHG offsets crop prices and welfare. 
3.2 Brief Literature Review 
Some recent studies have addressed marginal land potentials and possibilities to 
grow switchgrass. Milbrandt et al. (2014) examined the potential for rising energy crops 
including switchgrass on marginal land using crop yield estimates by county, and show 
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that biomass on marginal land could produce about 1.9 PWh (petawatthour) of 
electricity. They also indicate that high yields of switch grass on marginal land cause 
production to be more probable in the Eastern States and the North West (reaching more 
than 8 t/acre in some counties), with very poor performance is expected in the dry West.  
Gelfand et al. (2013) estimate that 21 gigaliters of ethanol per year could be 
generated by growing biomass crops on marginal lands, which is equal to approximately 
25% of the 2022 target for cellulosic ethanol under the RFS2 mandate. Schmer et al. 
(2008) estimate that cellulosic ethanol derived from marginal land switchgrass could 
produce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions that on average are about 94% lower than 
estimated GHG emissions from gasoline.  
Choice by a farmer on how to use her land depends on profitability of growing a 
crop. Profitability depends on opportunity cost of using that land for its other options 
along with input and output prices. Mooney et al. (2008) studied how switchgrass yield 
is influenced by seeding and nitrogen fertilization rates in low and intermediate 
environments, also they studied the economically optimal seeding rate and nitrogen 
fertilization rate. They show that for an expected stand lifespan of 10 years, production 
costs changed from $45 per ton in an ideal production environment to $70 per ton on 
marginal lands. Recent US policies on promoting biofuel have created higher demands 
for biofeedstocks with accompanying price rises. This also improves the profitability of 
the production of biomass on lower quality, less valuable land.  
Ricardo (1817) provides a basic theoretical framework for considering alternative 
land uses with respect to the quality of the land unit used. By this theory we can explain 
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how increase in demand for advanced biofuel because of RFS and rise in the value of 
cellulosic biofeedstock will expand the range of land dedicated to these biofeedstock 
compare to corn. Figure 10 portrays how rise in switchgrass price will lead to low 
quality land expansion. As shown in the figure, the first section (up to line A) is the high 
quality land. Grains like corn which need good soil, are profitable on this kind of land. 
As the quality of land decreases, other biomass which can be produced on low quality 
land is desirable up until to the point that the marginal costs just equals the marginal 
value of the product (B). When the price of biomass increases (the dotted line) the 
biomass production becomes profitable in a wider range of situations. From the left  
some of the higher quality land previously used in corn might be used and from the right 
yet lower quality land will be used (to the point C) (Swinton et al. 2011). 
 
Figure 10. Production net revenue graphed over a continuum of land quality (Barlowe 1986). 
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Swinton et al. (2011) found that doubling the expected profitability of major crops 
increase the amount of lands under cultivation by 3.2%. They also concluded that a rise 
in biomass prices will cause increased land competition in the short term and in turn 
rises in conventional crop prices. 
 3.3 Methodology 
In this work we use Forest and Agricultural Sector Optimization Model 
(FASOMGHG) to simulate the effects of growing switchgrass on marginal land. 
FASOM is a dynamic nonlinear programming, optimization model of US forest and 
agricultural sector (Beach and McCarl 2010; Lee et al. 2002). The optimization problem 
maximizes the net present value of overall welfare. The welfare is the sum of 
consumers’ and producers’ surplus plus GHG payments. The constraints of the model 
represent resources such as land and labor and also GHG emissions from the agriculture 
sector.  The model depicts production of crops, livestocks and processed agricultural 
products in the US.  
In FASOM switchgrass is a primary product and cellulosic biofuel is a secondary 
product. In producing switchgrass the objective function includes cost of production, 
costs of moving and utilizing the feedstock (hauling and transformation costs) to a point 
at which it substitute for fossil fuels and also demand coefficients for cellulosic ethanol 
and biofeedstocks for electricity. Utilization cost is associated with processing variables 
(McCarl et al. 2005).  
For this work, a new crop - “switchgrass- marginal land” - is introduced into the model. 
The crop budget,  cost and yield data for growing switchgrass on marginal land were 
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obtained  from the  Bio-Based Energy Analysis Group at the University of Tennessee 
(Yu et al. 2014) in US states where they judged switchgrass could be cultivated on 
marginal land  -  Florida, New York, Wisconsin, Georgia, Louisiana, Virginia, 
Mississippi, Missouri, Texas, South Dakota, Wyoming. In turn “Switchgrass- marginal 
land” was as assumed a perfect substitute for switchgrass from crop land in producing 
biofeedstocks for cellulosic ethanol and bioelectricity production although with a higher 
hauling cost following procedures in (McCarl et al. 2000).   
Table 6 presents the blending processing of “Switchgrass- marginal land” into 
secondary products. 
 
Table 6 Products produced from processing of switchgrass from marginal land.  
FASOMGHG name for  
regional non feed processing  
alternative 
Secondary product  
manufactured  
Switchgrass To Electricity Tbtus 
Switchgrass To Ethanol Celluslosic Ethanol 
 
The model will be run with the Renewable Fuel Standard mandates at the levels for 
2022, with and without switchgrass on marginal land. In this research there are three 
main scenarios: base, mandatory and voluntary carbon offset markets. Following the 
discussion from previous chapter the base case is where the carbon price is zero and 
there is no offset market. The mandatory scenario is where the agriculture sector is 
entirely covered by the offset program and is paid for offsets but also incurs liabilities if 
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emissions increase. Also the voluntary offset market in this study is where optin 
producers are only paid for better performance compared to the hybrid baseline. 
Following our discussion from previous chapter, the hybrid baseline is calculated while 
providing incentives for biofuel production. Therefore by voluntary program in this 
study we mean hybrid baseline scenario. 
3.4 Results  
3.4.1 GHG Effects 
Direct effect of substituting biofuels for fossil fuels is offsetting GHG emissions in 
general. Some argue that growing cellulosic crops on marginal land could provide GHG 
abatement provided there is not a large release of sequestered carbon “carbon debt” and 
the switchgrass sequesters more than the native vegetation (Gelfand et al. 2013).  
However this involves a land use change releasing some carbon plus uses inputs that 
cause emissions and thus we need the GHG’s life cycle of production plus combustion 
of biofuels under base model, no marginal land conditions to exceed that when using 
marginal land (Mitchell, Harmon and O'Connell 2012). This involves changes in soil 
carbon sequestration, emissions from fertilization and machinery, and emissions from 
transportation of biofeedstock to the bio refinery. 
 The total GHG results are compared for cases with and without marginal land in 
scenarios of this study: base, mandatory and voluntary with hybrid baseline. These 
results are portrayed in Figure 11. When there is no offset program and the carbon price 
is zero we find the total GHG net emissions are higher under the scenario with marginal 
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land. The results show that GHGs produced from fuel and fertilizer are higher when we 
use marginal land compared to no marginal land. But as one can see in Figure 11, under 
carbon offset programs with 30 $CO2e we encounter a higher GHG offset under the 
mandatory program. The reason is bioelectricity becomes profitable when carbon has 
value and so switchgrass on marginal land as biofeedstocks is used to contribute to GHG 
mitigation via bioelectricity.  
When the program is voluntary growing switchgrass on marginal land the GHG 
contribution is not different than that which arises under no marginal land. The total 
emissions increase with marginal land use due to emissions from fertilizer, fuel, and land 
conversion carbon debt but this is not enough to eliminate the bioelectricity gains.  
 
 
Figure 11. Total GHG annual flux in million tons CO2 equivalent at 30$ CO2e. 
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3.4.2 Production and RFS Mandate Satisfaction  
Renewable fuel standard (RFS) called for production and usage of 36 billion gallons 
of biofuels by 2022 in transportation fuel. Of this, 16 billion gallons is expected to be 
from cellulosic biofuels. Switchgrass can be converted to cellulosic ethanol fuel and 
therefore could play an important role in fulfillment of RFS mandates.  
A major concern regarding RFS mandates is land competition caused when 
substituting biofuel feedstocks for conventional food and feed plus the rise in 
commodity prices (Searchinger et al, 2008). One advantage of growing switchgrass on 
marginal land is to overcome the competition and production decline/market price 
increase problem through using the lands inappropriate for crop production. As a result 
one can see in Figure 12 that by using marginal lands, the acres of conventional land 
under switchgrass cultivation does not increase from 2015 to 2022, while the RFS 
requirements on cellulosic biofuel grows from 3 to 16 billion gallons. Thus the RFS 
requirements are fulfilled from the switchgrass on marginal lands without putting as 
much pressure on conventional cropland. The relative change in acres of selected 
conventional crops is shown in  
Table 7 for years 2015 to 2025. The results are presenting increase or not significant 
change in acres under conventional crops production. Although the acres under corn 
production falls which might be due to less demand for first generation of biofuel. That 
makes switchgrass to substituting for corn as it is used to produce advanced biofuel.    
 56 
 
 
Figure 12. Acres of switchgrass production in voluntary program. 
 
Table 7 Relative changes in million acres of conventional crop production when using marginal land 
in voluntary program. 
 2015 2020 2025 
Rice 0.00194 -0.00820 -0.00486 
White Wheat 0.00026 0.02675 -0.00041 
Hay 0.00030 0.00078 0.00194 
Potatoes 0.00623 -0.00229 0.00089 
Tomato  0.00315 0.00191 0.00129 
Corn -0.00505 -0.00170 -0.00964 
 
3.4.3 Commodity Price and Welfare Effect 
As mentioned in previous section, a major concern regarding RFS mandates to 
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price fisher index of all farm products, all live stocks, all processed products, wheat, rice, 
hay in our model to compare them with and without the marginal land option. The 
results are presented in Table 8.  
 The base, no carbon price case shows the availability of marginal lands reduces 
livestock, wheat and rice prices by 20, 6 and 3 percent respectively compared to the 
results without marginal land. The livestock price fall is likely due to increases in 
feedstuff production. As one can see in the same table production of feedstuff such as 
rice and barely increased by using marginal land. Other feedstuff’s production such as 
hay and wheat decreases.  
There is a slight increase in all farm and processed products prices when marginal 
land is included perhaps due to the fact that marginal lands were providing pasture for 
cow calf operations and that this requires more intensive livestock feeding. Also farm 
production decreases so that may also increase the prices. The fall in other farm products 
could be due to generated income from marginal when it is used for producing 
switchgrass for bioenergy. 
The results of price change when marginal land is included under carbon offset 
programs are also reported in the Table 8. The price changes are not perceptible as in 
base case but there is less than 1% increase in mandatory and voluntary programs. Under 
carbon offset market, switchgrass is mainly used to produce electricity rather than 
ethanol to be blended in motor fuel, so the effects of RFS on prices still stays.  
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Table 8 Annual production, price and export index change when marginal land is used in all 
scenarios compare to no marginal land use. 
 Base Mandatory Voluntary 
All FarmProduction  -0.0022 -0.0027 -0.0028 
All FarmPrice  0.0114 0.0028 0.0046 
all Farm export 0.0060 -0.0036 -0.0053 
    
AllProcessed 
production -0.0027 -0.0004 -0.0004 
AllProcessed price 0.0022 0.0060 0.0058 
AllProcessed export -0.0068 -0.0095 -0.0081 
    
AllLivestock 
production -0.0054 -0.0002 -0.0002 
AllLivestock price -0.2013 0.0017 0.0041 
    
Wheat production -0.0091 -0.0056 -0.0055 
Wheat price -0.0665 0.0052 0.0094 
Wheat export 0.03441 -0.0027 -0.0039 
    
Rice production 0.0131 0.0002 -0.0008 
Rice price -0.0327 -0.0001 -0.0004 
Rice export 0.3119 0.0002 -0.0008 
    
Barley production 0.0335 0.0034 -0.0008 
Barley price 0.0638 0.0081 0.0100 
 
Production of switchgrass on marginal lands could encourage economic growth in 
rural areas and enhance agricultural producer incomes (Jensen et al. 2007).Welfare 
effects have been studied in this work when using marginal land for switchgrass 
production. The total welfare increases when using marginal land in all the scenarios, 
although it is highest in the base case with no offset program. This result is reported in 
Table 9. 
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Also the distribution of welfare under base case is depicted in Figure 13. As one can 
see in this figure the producers’ surplus increased significantly. The reason is the added 
economic profit from using marginal lands. Consumer and total foreign surpluses 
decrease. The reason is as presented in Table 8, some production indices show decrease 
and their price indices accordingly show rise. Although the rise in price is slight but it 
could lower the consumer welfare. Foreign welfare is sum over foreign consumers and 
producers welfare which is slightly decreasing. Foreign consumers would be worse off 
because of less US export and higher commodity prices, but this has advantages for 
foreign producers. In total the loss in foreign consumers’ welfare exceeds the gain in 
foreign producers’ surplus.  The export indices for all farm and processed products, 
wheat and rice are also reported in Table 8. 
 
Table 9 Percent change of total welfare increase when marginal land included. 
 Base Mandatory Voluntary 
% Total welfare 
change 0.0528 0.0047 0.0046 
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Figure 13. Relative change in welfare distribution in base scenario. 
 
Also the relative welfare distribution with respect to carbon equivalent prices is 
presented in Figure 14 under the voluntary carbon offset program for 5 and 30 $CO2e. 
With marginal land in the model, as the carbon price increases producers’ welfare 
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Figure 14. Relative welfare distribution change in voluntary program regarding different CO2e 
prices. 
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could help controlling erosion in base scenario. Figure 15 is showing the relative change 
in erosion when marginal land is included compared to no marginal land.  
We also examine the erosion effects under carbon offset programs as well. 
Mitigation strategies and results and land usage vary with carbon prices. At low carbon 
prices dominant low cost strategies are those consistent with existing production such as 
changes in tillage practice, fertilizer application, diet and manure management.  At high 
prices, emission abatements emerge mainly from forestry and biofuels (McCarl and 
Schneider 2001; Smith et al. 2008).  In Figure 15 we portray the erosion results under 
mandatory and voluntary programs for carbon equivalent prices of 5 and 30 $ when 
marginal land is an option. The results indicate that total erosion at higher price (here 30 
$CO2e) will decrease when marginal land is included in the model compare to the same 
program with no marginal land, but at 5 $ the overall erosion increases. 
 
 
Figure 15. Relative change in erosion with respect to no marginal land in each scenario. 
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Switchgrass grows in a large portion of the US with low fertilizer applications and 
high resistance to naturally occurring pests and diseases (Jensen, 2007). The amount of 
fertilizer switchgrass needs depends on region, yield goal and productive potential of 
land (Christensen, 2010). Figure 16 and Figure 17 presents the loss in overall Potassium 
and Nitrogen by including growing switchgrass on marginal land to agricultural sector’s 
lands. The only raise at potassium level is in mandatory program with 30 $ CO2e. 
 
 
Figure 16. Relative change in potassium with marginal land. 
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Figure 17. Relative change in nitrogen with marginal land.  
 
 3.5 Conclusion 
Land competition is a concern when producing large quantities of biofeedstocks to 
meet RFS mandates. The concern rises due to two reasons: first, Competition for 
cropland and commodities could lower conventional crop production raising prices and 
threaten food and feed security. Second conversion of new lands into bioenergy 
production could worsen climate change effects by emitting carbon stored in soils and 
vegetation plus emitting GHGs from production process.  
    Producing biofuel feedstocks on marginal lands could be one solution to the land 
competition concern. Marginal lands are appropriate for growing some kinds of biomass 
such switchgrass. In this work we use FASOM-GHG to examine some of the questions 
regarding market penetration, potential GHG mitigation, price, production, welfare and 
environmental effects of using marginal land to produce switchgrass.  
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  The net effects of using marginal lands on GHG offsets are complex and dependent 
on other mitigation practices. Generally the model results show using marginal land 
increases overall GHG emissions due to emissions from the added fertilizer and fuel 
consumption on the marginal lands plus no real gain in sequestration. However a 
different result emerges under carbon offset programs with GHGs reduced somewhat 
due to a flow of switchgrass into bioelectricity with accompanying offsets relative to 
coal. This indicates that using marginal land could reduce GHGs if bioelectricity is 
supported due to its higher carbon offset rates.  
   We also find that using marginal land for producing cellulosic biofuel takes the 
pressure off of conventional land use to satisfy the RFS mandate in the absence of 
carbon prices. Additionally this will help reduce several agricultural product prices 
although is not true for all agricultural products. Marginal land does not cause 
agricultural commodity prices to decrease when carbon prices are substantial because 
this causes use of the marginal land generated switchgrass for electricity production and 
the pressure remains to meet the RFS2 mandates.  
Production on marginal land generally increases profits to agricultural producers. 
Our welfare study presents a significant increase in producers’ surplus. Also total 
welfare rises under all scenarios of this study when adding marginal land to the model 
although the loss of ecological services and other amenities is not accounted for. 
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CHAPTER IV  
ON THE DYNAMICS OF PRICE DISCOVERY: ENERGY AND 
AGRICULTURAL MARKETS WITH AND WITHOUT THE 
RENEWABLE FUELS MANDATE  
 
 4.1  Introduction 
Enhancing energy security and reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions are 
important reasons to promote renewable energy sources such as biofuels. To encourage 
biofuels, the US government has implemented renewable fuel standards (RFS) regarding 
the amount of ethanol to be blended into transportation fuel. Ethanol is an oxygen 
enhancing additive and a replacement for gasoline; therefore its price has a relationship 
with gasoline and also crude oil. There have been fluctuations in these relationships 
during past years.   
First generation ethanol is what we study in this work and its feedstock is mainly 
corn. Corn is also the major feed used by the livestock industry. The increase in corn use 
as a biofeedstock, especially after the ethanol boom that began in 2006 caused 
competition for land between food and fuel and accordingly food and feed price rises. 
This also is the source of concerns regarding RFS mandates which requires production 
of large quantities of biofeedstocks although higher energy prices are also a factor. 
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The nature of the evolving interdependency between energy and agriculture markets 
in the US plus the effects of the RFS mandates is the subject of this study. We study the 
dynamic relationships in and between the real prices of corn, soybeans, cattle, and hogs 
along with ethanol and the crack ratio (a measures of the refining margin).  We do this in 
a vector autoregression (VAR) framework.  Also in this work, the contemporaneous 
causal flow among the variables is identified using a data determined technique (Bessler 
and Yang 2003; Mjelde and Bessler 2009). Using directed acyclic graphs to investigate 
transmitted information among the variables allows us to estimate impulse responses and 
forecast error variance decomposition from VAR allows comparison to other studies. 
Also we perform price forecasting taking into account for RFS policies in the model and 
also blending wall issues. 
 4.2     Background and Brief Literature Review 
Variety of policies has been emerged in US to encouraged biofuel directly or 
indirectly. One of the major policies in this regard was subsidization of ethanol in the 
United States, which began with the Energy Policy Act of 1978. Since then, the subsidy 
has ranged between 40¢ per gallon and 60¢ per gallon of ethanol, and most recently until 
it was discontinued on December 31, 2011 was 45¢ per gallon (Abbott, Hurt and Tyner 
2011). Throughout the last three decades of ethanol production, the subsidy has been a 
fixed amount per gallon, invariant with oil or corn prices (Tyner and Taheripour 2008). 
In 1990, the Clean Air Act was passed, which required vendors of gasoline to have a 
minimum oxygen percentage in their product because adding oxygen enables the fuel to 
burn cleaner. Two options for oil industry to meet this requirement was ethanol and 
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methyl tertiary butyl ether (MTBE). MTBE was generally a cheaper alternative than 
ethanol, but it showed negative environmental consequences and was gradually banned 
on a state-by-state basis (Birur, Hertel and Tyner 2009). 
The 2006 Ban of MTBE, combined with high crude oil price (which climbed to over 
$100/bbl in 2004) and the ethanol tax credit raised the profitability of ethanol industry 
particularly beginning in 2004 and 2005. High profit margins from ethanol production in 
2004–2007 encouraged rapid investment in the ethanol industry during those years 
(Tyner et al. 2008). Between 2006 and 2008, the correlation between crude oil and corn 
prices was strong, in part because ethanol was needed to supply the oxygenate market. 
After 2008 the oxygenate market was largely saturated, ethanol prices ceased their rapid 
rise (and corn prices rose significantly), making ethanol production unprofitable in many 
cases. In 2008-09 and afterward, we see a high correlation (about 0.84 in 2008) between 
ethanol and corn prices, since the profitability of ethanol production depends on corn 
price (Abbott, Hurt and Tyner 2011). 
On December, 2007, the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (H.R. 
6) was signed into law. This legislation amended the Renewable Fuels Standard (RFS) 
mandating a phase-in for renewable fuel volumes beginning with 9 billion gallons in 
2008 and ending at 36 billion gallons in 2022. Growth of corn based ethanol industry in 
last few years makes corn an energy crop and ties its price partially to energy prices.   
Corn is also, an important source of feed for production of livestock, poultry, and 
dairy products. These uses established a relationship between ethanol and corn price and 
also the products from corn. Production of biofuels affects the agriculture market in that 
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diversion of land to produce biofeedstocks reduces the supply of other products and as a 
result there is a likely rise in prices. Alexander and Hurt (2007) suggest that in the long 
run, food will be able to compete successfully with the use of crops for fuel, but 
probably with somewhat higher food prices and greater costs of food to consumers. 
 Several studies in the literature address the interactions of ethanol production and 
the energy market. For instance, Du and Hayes (2009) calculated the average impact of 
ethanol production on the gasoline price. Estimation results indicate that, on average, 
over the whole sample period (2000-2010) the growth in ethanol production reduced 
wholesale gasoline prices by $0.25/gallon. Also changes in the price of crude oil were 
found to have effects on biofuel production and prices. The FAO (2010) finds when 
crude oil prices increase agricultural commodity markets are affected in two ways. First, 
crop production costs increase leading to a reduction in supply and a consequent rise in 
commodity prices. Second, an increase in petroleum-based fuel prices provides an 
incentive to biofuel producers to expand production, which in turn expands demand for 
agricultural feedstock crops causing prices to increase. In turn they state that the net 
impact on commodity markets will depend on the degree of increase in biofuel prices 
relative to the increase in total crop production cost.  
Figure 18 shows the indices of corn, crude oil, ethanol, and gasoline prices since 
2000 based on data from the Energy Information Administration (EIA) and USDA. The 
graph shows these prices have moved together since 2007. In particular before 2007 corn 
price and crude oil price showed limited responses to each other’s movement, but after 
this time they show a stronger relationship. The same is true for corn and gasoline. 
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Gasoline’s price has not increased as much as crude oil’s price since 2007, the reason 
could be that crude oil is not the only cost factor in gasoline production. 
 
 
Figure 18. Price index for selected commodities. 
 
Bryant and Outlaw (2006) studied the effect of government policies (RFS and 
exemption of tax credits) on ethanol production and price by 2012. They conclude that 
due to powerful market-based incentives the increases in levels of ethanol production 
would be likely in coming years, even in the absence of government programs. Carter, 
Rausser and Smith (2012)  estimated that corn prices were about 30 percent greater, on 
average, between 2006 and 2010 than they would have been if ethanol production had 
remained at 2005 levels with no RFS. Tyner (2010) studied links between agriculture 
and energy markets and found strong correlation between crude oil and corn prices in 
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2006-2008 and little link between ethanol and corn prices. But in 2009, when there was 
ethanol surplus in the market the link between ethanol and corn price was strongest. 
In recent years, drops in gasoline usage in US and market (blending wall) limitations 
to future growth in the blending of biofuel have resulted in a fall in ethanol consumption 
(Westcott and McPhail 2013). Today Corn ethanol covers 10% of finished motor 
gasoline in US (E10). E85 (with 70-85% ethanol content) is consumed in limited 
volumes, and the infrastructure is not prepared to increase this volume. One concern of 
today’s ethanol industry is that we have reached a blending limit known as blending 
wall. That means reaching the RFS targets for corn ethanol by 2022 will require raising 
the E10 blend standard for regular vehicles. 
4.3     Empirical Methods 
4.3.1 Vector Autoregression Model 
In this study, we will use Vector autoregression (VAR) model for our analysis. Using 
this model let us analyze the regularities in the set of variables without imposing any 
prior restriction is an advantage of VAR (Greene 2003). A VAR can be expressed as: 
          
 
            
Where    a (mx1) vector of variables and m is is the number of series.    is a (qx1) 
vector of strictly exogenous variables.    and C are appropriately dimensioned matrices 
of coefficients. The integers k and t are the number of lags and time indexes, 
respectively.     is the innovation term and it is assumed to be white noise, means E (  ) 
= 0. The innovations    and    are independent for s≠t. Although serially uncorrelated, 
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contemporaneous correlation among the elements of    is possible, ∑= E        is an 
(mxm) positive definite matrix.   
Contemporaneously correlated innovations could mislead the information one gleans 
from the vector autoregression (by confounding innovation accounting results). A 
Choleski factorization is one way to address this issue. In this method, we need to pre 
multiply the system by lower triangular matrix      , such that     ∑       . The 
problem with this method is that it imposes an ordering through Choleski factorization. 
Our theory is sometimes not rich enough to suggest which series are exogenous. A 
Bernanke factorization is another option which allows more general causal flows. 
Following (Bernanke 1986) one can write the innovations as a linear function of 
orthogonal innovations: 
        
Multiplying matrix A to non-orthogonal innovations, gives orthogonal innovations 
provides the identified structural VAR. The transformed VAR will thus look as follows: 
            
 
   
          
If         and    =  , then we can also write the equation in moving average 
form as follows: 
              
 
   
 
There exist some rules in the literature on number of free parameters to maintain 
identification (Doan 1993). Compares to Choleski decomposition which imposes a just 
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identified structure, Bernanke allows more flexible identification method based on 
theory. In this study we will use algorithms of inductive causation (Pearl 2000) with 
acyclic graphical representations to hold identifying restrictions on matrix A (Awokuse 
and Bessler 2003). 
4.3.2 Directed Acyclic Graphs  
We use Directed acyclic graphs; based on graph theory, to explore the causal 
ordering among the variables of our model.  This method finds the causal flow among 
the variables by using arrows and vertices (Pearl 2000) and statistically inferred 
information about the probability distribution of the estimated residuals. In other words, 
it consists of a set of variables and the directed or undirected edges between some of the 
variables (Pearl 1995). A causal model such as A → B is a directed graph, which means 
A causes B. It means one can change the value of B by changing the value of A. A 
directed acyclic graph is a directed graph that contains no directed cyclic paths (Spirtes, 
Glymour and Scheines 2000).  For instance A→B→C→A is a cyclic graph, since we 
return to the same variable as we start with.  
Directed acyclic graphs (DAGS) show the conditional independencies as implied by 
the recursive product decomposition:  
                             
 
     
Here Pr is the probability of the variables               and     is the minimum 
subset of variables that comes before     in causal sense. 
Pearl (1995) also suggests the concept of D-separation as a method in DAGS to 
verify the causal ordering. A variable D-separates two variables when it blocks the 
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information flow between them. One basic pattern of causal relationship is the causal 
chain (A→B→C). In this chain A and C are dependent unless we condition on B. The 
other pattern is a causal fork (A← B→C), in which A and C are dependent until we 
condition on B. Also the last pattern is a causal collider (A→B←C), in this case A and C 
are independent but are dependent when we condition on B. DAGs infer the causal 
direction first by testing the correlation between the variables and then by doing a 
conditional correlation on a third variable and seeing the variables follow any of the 
above rules of causal ordering. 
The Lingam (Linear Non-Gaussian Acyclic Model) algorithm (Shimizu et al. 2006) 
is used in this study to figure out the causal ordering among the variables. This method is 
appropriate when at most one of the variable’s noises may be Gaussian. Spirtes et al. 
(2010) explain this method as a system such as: 
1)      
2)         
3)         
Where a, b and c are the coefficients and    ,    ,    are independent noises. If we 
write these equations in reduced forms, we will have: 
4)      
5)           
6)                   
LiNGAM algorithm can find the correct matching of coefficients in the Independent 
Component Analysis (ICA) matrix (Hyvärinen and Oja 2000) and prune away any 
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insignificant coefficients using statistical criteria (Spirtes et al. 2010). A unique DAG 
will be constructed, since the coefficients are determined for each variable. The required 
assumptions are: 1) no unmeasured common causes; 2) dependent variable could be 
explained by a linear equation; 3) relation among variables are not deterministic; 4) i.i.d 
sampling; 5) Markov condition, which is probability distribution  explain one variable is 
only condition on the variables of direct cause (Spirtes et al. 2010). 
4.3.3 Forecasting and Conditional Forecasting 
In the literature, using conditional forecasting is an approach to evaluate a policy. It 
is of interest sometimes to consider the forecast of some variables in the system 
conditional on some knowledge of the future path of other variables in the system. Sims, 
Goldfeld and Sachs (1982) address important issues on how to conduct a formal policy 
analysis.  
We can use Vector Autoregression to do policy analysis. Assuming a policy 
instrument is exogenous; one can view a VAR model’s forecasts conditional on different 
hypothetical values of instrument as capturing the effect of alternative instrument 
settings on the endogenous variables (Cooley and LeRoy 1985). If we force some values 
on future path of one variable, this will result in restrictions on the other variables of the 
system as well. In general forecasting our best guess of future disturbances could be 
zero, but in conditional forecasting by forcing a value on some variables we cannot 
assume zero disturbances on other variables. The disturbance is not zero to adapt real 
values to the required (policy) values.  
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If we wish to forecast one period ahead conditional on a specific policy, we know the 
future of policy variable and also the model at the current time. Here is the setup: 
                             
This equation is showing at time t we are predicting for t+1. Since we know the 
current and past states (history), so we will have: 
                   
Identification of this system depends on the structure imbedded in the matrix   . 
This structure on   , will communicate the implied path on other variables, in addition 
to the policy variable whose future values the governmental authority sets.  Therefore for 
this model to be identified, we need sufficient restrictions on     matrix. For VAR in N 
variables if we leave more than N(N-1)/2 parameters free (to be estimated) the model is 
not identified. The restrictions on   , come from theory or inductive causation. We can 
use the algorithms of inductive causation (communicated through the DAG structure) on 
the VAR innovations derive the restriction on     in contemporaneous time. 
4.4  Data 
The data used in this study are monthly spanning from January 2000 to April 2013 
(160 observations). The period after 2000 is used, since ethanol production has only 
shown marked increases since 2000.  Our data includes corn price (corp), ethanol price 
(ethp), ethanol production (eprod) and also soybean price, cattle price and hog price 
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(soyp, cattp, hogp) are representatives to show the effects on agricultural market. The 
agricultural products prices are from the USDA website1. 
In addition we study the Crack ratio (crkr), to show effects of energy market 
following Du and Hayes (2009) and Knittel and Smith (2012). The crack ratio is a 
measure of the refining margin. Du and Hayes (2009) define it as the price of gasoline 
divided by the price of oil. The gasoline price variable is the “total gasoline 
wholesale/resale price by refiners”, which excludes taxes and reflects primarily gasoline 
prior to blending with ethanol. Crude oil price is the “national average refiner acquisition 
cost of crude oil”.  
The energy data and also Ethanol production data were obtained from the U.S. 
Energy Information Administration (EIA) website.  The ethanol price data source is 
Hart's Oxy-Fuel News. The price data were all deflated by the consumer price index 
(CPI) drawn from U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics website. To get the real prices, each 
price is divided by, CPI in each month/CPI in April 2013. CPI index is from U.S. Bureau 
of Labor Statistics. Plots of the price series for each market are provided in Figure 19. 
4.5 Empirical Results 
4.5.1 Stationarity 
To choose the best model to describe our time series we need to test for stationarity. 
Therefore we performed two tests: Dickey–Fuller (DF) and Augmented Dickey–Fuller 
(ADF) and the results have been shown in Table 10. DF results show that at both critical 
                                                 
1 www.usda.gov 
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value ethanol price, crack ratio and hog price are stationary and the rest of variables are 
non-stationary. 
 
Figure 19. Monthly time series plot of major variables used in model (January2000- April 2013) 
with all prices expressed in real April, 2013 dollars.   
 79 
 
The ADF test indicates that the crack ratio and hog price variables are stationary 
with 2 and 1 lag respectively.  We also find the ethanol price with 2 lags is stationary. 
The rest of variables are showing non stationary. 
 
Table 10 Dickey–Fuller (DF) and Augmented Dickey–Fuller (ADF) for non-stationary of variables. 
The DF test is implemented through an ordinary least squares regression of the first 
differences of prices on a constant and one lag of the levels of prices (Greene 2003). In ADF test, 
k lags of dependent variable are included in the regression. The null hypothesis for the test 
statistic of both tests is the data is non stationary in levels. The null hypothesis is rejected when 
the observed t-statistics are less than this critical value.  The 5% and 10% critical values are (-
2.89, -2.58) (Fuller, 1976). ADF regression runs with 12 lags and the chosen lag number (K) is 
the minimized Schwarz loss metric. Also the Q-statistics is the Lung-Box statistics on the 
estimated residuals from the test regression. The p-value with respect to each Q-statistics is 
given in the parenthesis. 
 
4.5.2 Optimal Lag Length 
We use Schwarz loss, Akaike loss, Hannan and Quinn’s phi measures to determine 
the optimal length of lags for the VAR model (Table 11). To find the optimal lag we 
Variables Dickey-Fuller Augmented Dickey-Fuller 
Test    Q Test  K    Q 
Corn Price -0.29 62.23 
(0.00) 
-0.32 1 60.99 
(0.00) 
Ethanol Price -4.31 45.71 
(0.12) 
-2.84 2 31.18 
(0.69) 
Crack Ratio -5.15 70.42 
(0.00) 
-2.99 2 61.52 
(0.00) 
Ethanol   Production 0.13 667.99 
(0.00) 
-0.08 1 249.14 
(0.00) 
Soybeans Price -1.43 70.78 
(0.00) 
-1.28 1 38.30 
(0.36) 
Cattle Price -2.46 302.88 
(0.00) 
-2.33 1 81.43 
(0.00) 
Hog Price -3.51 76.56 
(0.00) 
-3.30 1 71.05 
(0.00) 
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tried these tests for different set of regressions with seasonality, break and lags. We 
implement the Bai-Parron break test and we choose ethanol production’s break at 
February 2009. The optimal lag length results shows smaller numbers with only 
seasonality and lags and not break included.  
 
Table 11 VAR optimal lag length determination 
 
Number of lags 
Schwarz 
Information 
Criterion 
(SIC) 
 
Hannan and 
Quinn Information 
Criterion (HQIC) 
Akaike 
Information 
Criterion 
(AIC) 
1   14.0694* 12.4485 10.4536 
2 14.5285   12.3103* 10.2122 
3 15.6201 12.8047 10.6032 
4 16.9162 13.5036 10.1988 
5 18.0327 14.0229 10.6147 
6 19.1616 14.5546 11.0430 
7 19.9150 14.7108 10.0959 
8 20.8277 15.0263 10.3080 
9 21.8751 15.4765 10.6549 
10 22.8041 15.8082 10.8833 
11 23.4828 15.8898 9.8615 
12 23.9342 15.7439   9.6123* 
Note: * indicates the most appropriate lag order for the considered model.  
The information criteria used to identify the optimal lag length (p) of a VAR process 
are                  
  
 
 ,                 
    
 
 , and                 
  
         
 
 , where     is the maximum likelihood estimate of variance-covariance matrix of  , 
p is the proposed lag length, n is the number of variables, and T is the sample size. 
 
 
As one can see in this table, Schwarz loss, Hannan and Quinn’s phi measures and 
Akaike loss are minimized at 1, 2 and 10 lags respectively. Smaller lag length seems to 
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be more reasonable for our study, so we need to choose between the one or 2 month lag 
as idenitified by the Schwarz loss and Hannan and Quinn’s phi measures. We will use a 
two-lag VAR model suggested by Hannan and Quinn’s phi measure since the Schwarz 
loss metric may have a tendency to over-penalize additional regressors compared to the 
other metrics (Geweke and Meese 1981). 
4.5.3 Estimation Results of Two-Lag VAR 
The p-values of F-test associated with the null hypothesis of both coefficients of one 
and two-lagged prices jointly equal to zero at 10% level of statistical significance are 
given in Table 12. As one can see in the table, all the variables have at least one other 
significant coefficient in their equation, except for the hog equation. We find the Corn 
price coefficient is significant in both the ethanol price and ethanol production relations.  
Also corn price and ethanol production are significant in the crack ratio equation along 
with the soybean price coefficient. Soybeans, Cattle and hog price coefficients are 
significant in five of the seven equations. Ethanol price is only significant in the ethanol 
production equation. 
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Table 12 P-values associated with F-tests for the null hypothesis of the coefficients on one- and two-
lagged prices on each of 7 variables are equal to zero in the two-lagged VAR(2) model estimation 
results. 
dependent 
variable CORP ETHP CRKR EPROD SOYP CATTP HOGP 
CORP 0.000* 0.388 0.075* 0.182 0.621 0.232 0.301 
ETHP 0.967 0.000* 0.260 0.013* 0.447 0.829 0.278 
CRKR 0.124 0.025* 0.000* 0.379 0.415 0.012* 0.828 
EPROD 0.134  0.393 0.033* 0.000* 0.094* 0.317 0.977 
SOYP 0.091*  0.861 0.060* 0.046* 0.000* 0.011* 0.209 
CATTP 0.005* 0.028* 0.843 0.006* 0.064* 0.000* 0.175 
HOGP 0.011* 0.025* 0.223 0.183 0.056* 0.098* 0.000* 
* Indicates the p-values below 10% significance level. 
 
4.5.4 Identifying Contemporaneous Structure 
We use LiNGAM algorithm to identify the causal structure of the variables in the 
model. This algorithm is appropriate to use when at most one variable is Gaussian. 
Therefore, the Normality test is applied before using LiNGAM in this study. A Jarque- 
Bera test has been applied to the data to determine whether they follow the skewness and 
kurtosis matching a normal distribution or not. The test statistic is as follows: 
   
 
 
      
 
 
         
Where n is the number of observation, S is the sample skewness, and K is the sample 
kurtosis. The results of the normality test are that we reject the null hypothesis of 
normality for all the variables except for ethanol price.  
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Using TETRAD (Scheines and Spirtes 1994) we implement LiNGAM algorithm 
with prune factor 0.7 to figure out the contemporaneous structure among the seven 
variables. Figure 20represents the causal structure we find among the variables of our 
model. As one can see in this figure, energy and agriculture markets are connected 
through the edge between corn price and ethanol price. The information flow is Corn 
price causes ethanol price.  Corn price also causes the soybean price.  
 
 
Figure 20 Directed acyclic graph of price interrelationships. 
 
4.5.5 Forecast Error Variance Decomposition 
To analyze the effect of each variable on the others in a short and long horizon we 
performed forecast error variance decomposition. The results of forecast error variance 
decomposition are reported in Table 13. The time horizon of decompositions is zero 
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(contemporaneous time), 1 month (short horizon), 6 months, 1 year and 3 years ahead 
(long term). The forecast error variance decomposition suggests that that in 
contemporaneous time agriculture market prices are all exogenous, except for soybeans 
where the variation is explained by innovations from corn (39.72%). 
Variation of corn price in long horizon is explained mainly by ethanol production 
and cattle price (11% and 13.3% respectively) and together with other variables they 
explain 50% of variation in corn price. In the short run, the variations in cattle and hog 
prices are affected only by corn and soybeans price innovations with the influence of 
soybeans being higher than that of corn. In the long term ethanol price, ethanol 
production and crack ratio play a role in explaining cattle and hog prices. For instance, 
crack ratio and ethanol production explain around 11% and 3.4% of the variation in 
cattle price respectively. 
In the energy market, the crack ratio is showing exogeneity in contemporaneous time 
and the variations in ethanol price are explained by itself mainly and also by corn price 
(4.7%).  In a 6 months horizon, Variations in ethanol price are explained by crack ratio 
for about 10%, but this amount decreases in long run (3 years) to about 8.7%. The 
influence of the crack ratio in explaining ethanol price is higher than the influence of 
corn price in the longer term. But the immediate effect of corn price on ethanol price is 
higher than crack ratio. Moreover, although in short run the variables of the model only 
explain about 9% of the variation in ethanol production but in long term (3years) this 
number increases to about 75%. The main variables which describe ethanol production 
variation in long term are crack ratio, cattle and hog prices.  
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Table 13 Forecast error variance decompositions from two-lag VAR. 
Step CORP ETHP CRKR EPROD SOYP CATTP HOGP 
CORP 1 100.0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 2 97.19 0.01 1.34 0.46 0.45 0.26 0.24 
 7 79.14 0.48 3.48 1.14 1.00 7.83 6.90 
 13 69.30 0.74 2.40 2.58 0.83 13.32 10.80 
 37 54.78 3.80 3.09 11.07 1.42 13.32 12.49 
ETHP  1 4.71 95.28 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 2 5.29 92.37 0.00 0.45 0.06 0.47 1.33 
 7 2.79 79.96 9.42 0.37 2.08 2.57 2.79 
 13 3.43 71.91 9.05 0.36 6.64 5.14 3.43 
 37 5.01 66.43 8.79 1.10 8.67 6.49 3.47 
CRKR 1 0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 2 0.30 0.03 96.77 0.35 1.33 0.03 1.15 
 7 0.29 1.99 85.75 0.70 8.12 1.37 1.75 
 13 0.41 2.07 81.74 1.37 9.57 2.14 2.67 
 37 1.09 1.75 69.35 3.68 8.52 10.88 4.70 
EPROD  1 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 2 0.56 1.72 0.98 92.24 1.69 0.93 1.85 
 7 0.73 6.62 2.96 69.19 4.79 10.97 4.70 
 13 0.39 6.30 6.59 51.03 5.55 19.31 10.79 
 37 2.62 2.30 9.91 25.15 2.37 42.79 14.82 
SOYP 1 39.72 0.00 0.00 0.00 60.27 0.00 0.00 
 2 38.39 0.05 0.55 0.07 60.82 0.00 0.09 
 7 34.14 1.43 1.12 0.85 50.08 2.92 9.42 
 13 34.50 2.99 1.03 2.68 40.25 4.44 14.09 
 37 29.45 3.89 2.97 9.97 30.20 6.75 16.74 
CATTP  1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.0 0.00 
 2 0.00 0.01 0.07 0.00 2.49 97.16 0.23 
 7 0.43 0.04 9.02 0.02 7.45 76.59 6.42 
 13 0.90 0.03 11.75 0.19 7.82 69.95 9.33 
 37 2.04 0.24 11.36 3.40 10.12 63.84 8.97 
HOGP  1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.0 
 2 1.61 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.34 0.11 97.82 
 7 2.15 2.30 1.53 0.10 2.22  2.68 88.97 
 13 1.72 3.05 1.72 0.12 10.49  7.82 75.05 
 37 1.58 2.84 3.32 0.91 16.17  11.20 63.95 
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4.5.6 Innovation Accounting 
We present impulse response functions to analyze the effects of a one-time only 
shock of one of the series on the other series. These are represented in Figure 21. 
Horizontal axes on the sub-graphs represent the horizon or number of months after the 
shock, where we portray 36 months. Vertical axes show the standardized response to the 
one time shock in each market. The variable’s names are labeled at top of the columns. 
Following (Sims and Zha 1999), we use Monte Carlo to provide confidence bands for 
impulse responses based on program by (Doan T. 2000). 
As one can see in Figure 21, a shock in ethanol production transferred as a positive 
and long lasting impulse to almost all of the agriculture market commodities’ prices 
(corn, soybeans and cattle). Also in the energy market, a shock in ethanol production has 
a negative influence on crack ratio, which dampens to zero in the long run. This means 
an increase in ethanol production decreases the gasoline refining margin and thus the 
ratio of the gasoline price relative to the crude oil price. Also a shock in ethanol price 
leads to a negative short term impulse in crack ratio, which dampens to zero in longer 
term. Increase in ethanol price will decrease the demand for blended fuel and also 
demand for gasoline. Therefore gasoline price will decrease in short term. But in longer 
tem this balances with gasoline production and the effects on gasoline price dampens to 
zero. Therefore ethanol and gasoline in the short run are acting as complementary goods. 
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The short run negative response of corn price to a one time shock in the crack ratio is 
likely subject to a similar explanation. An increase in the blended fuel price decreases 
demand for ethanol and the ethanol price and in turn the corn price. Also we see the 
ethanol production responds negatively to increase in the crack ratio in short term.  
A positive shock in the ethanol price leads to a positive short impulse in the hog price.  
This rise is likely due to due increased ethanol production with increased corn use and 
therefore higher effects on the corn prices and in turn increased costs of feeding hogs. 
The response also transmits to soybeans price with a shock in ethanol production 
increasing corn use and land/feed competition. 
We note also a one-time shock in corn price will lead to short positive impulse to 
ethanol price, since the ethanol production cost will increase. Also a shock to corn price 
will lead to positive response of soybeans price. Since soybeans is an important grain for 
animal feed, it could be a good substitute when price of corn increase. This excess 
demand will affect the soybeans price to increase, and it gradually dampens to zero. 
 
 88 
 
 
Figure 21. Impulse response functions from innovation of two-lag VAR. 
 
4.5.7 Forecasting and Conditional Forecasting 
We constructed forecasts for the prices out to 2022. In our forecasting we took into 
account the limits imposed by the Renewable Fuel Standards (RFS2) annual amount of 
ethanol content in blended fuel with gasoline. The 2007 EISA RFS limits corm ethanol 
to 13.8 and 14 billion in 2013 and 2014 respectively then to 15 billion gallons from 2015 
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to 2022. The required amount of ethanol blended into fuel is declared yearly, so we 
calculated monthly amounts using historical monthly shares. Taking the RFS mandated 
amount of ethanol we construct conditional forecasts. We also consider the case with no 
mandates and perform unconditional forecast on price series.  
Comparing conditional and unconditional forecasts (Figure 22), one can see that all 
agricultural commodities prices and ethanol price will be higher when we take into 
account for RFS requirements in our model, except for crack ratio. One can see the 
forecasting results in the Figure 22. The solid line after Jan 2013 to the end of 2022 is 
the unconditional forecast and the dotted line is the forecast conditional on RFS policies. 
The average percent different of conditional forecast compare to unconditional is 
presented in Table 14. Conditional forecasting gives us an annual average corn price 
which is 13.3% higher than under the unconditional forecast 2022. This difference is 
5.7% for ethanol price and also 12.6% and almost 4% for soybean and cattle prices. By 
contrast, the conditional forecasts regarding RFS requirements leads to almost a 6% 
lower crack ratio than when there are no RFS requirements in the model. 
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----- Conditional Forecasts   ──── Unconditional Forecasts 
Figure 22. Historical prices plus forecasts to 2022 conditional and unconditional on RFS. 
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Table 14 Average percent difference in conditional forecasts with respect to unconditional forecasts. 
 CORP ETHP CRKR SOYP      CATTP     HOGP 
With RFS 
mandates 13.33 5.73 -5.86 12.06 3.97 1.48 
With EIA 
projection 7.91 3.45 -3.83 7.29 1.88 0.47 
 
 
In 2013, the blend wall limited ethanol consumption in E10 (motor gasoline contains 
10% ethanol) to about 13.3 billion gallons (U.S. Energy Information Administration 
2013). For this reason and also constant gasoline consumption of 138 billion gallons as 
in predictions, ethanol falling short of required amount in the mandate (Westcott and 
McPhail 2013). This extra requirement of RFS was substituted by blending advanced 
biofuels in excess of advanced RFS or by using accumulated credits (RINs) (Irwin and 
Good 2013a). There are two ways to meet EPA requirement and expand the blend wall: 
1) increase in domestic gasoline consumption, 2) consumption of E15 or E85 instead of 
E10 (Irwin and Good 2013b). For this last one to happen we need a lower ethanol price 
compared to gasoline price since a gallon of E85 contains 75% energy of a same amount 
of gasoline (Irwin and Good 2013b). On May 7th 2014, Energy Information 
Administration had released a projection on the amount of ethanol accredited to RFS 
considering the blending wall (U.S. Energy Information Administration 2014) which is 
partially different from RFS required amount. One can compare the projection amount 
with RFS requirement in Table 15. We performed conditional forecasting on prices 
regarding EIA projection of ethanol amount as well.    
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Table 15 Ethanol requirement in billion gallons in RFS and EIA projection of credits earned from 
ethanol. 
 
RFS requirements EIA projection 
2013 13.8 13.31 
2014 14.5 12.73 
2015 15 13.59 
2016 15 13.65 
2017 15 13.84 
2018 15 13.91 
2019 15 13.95 
2020 15 14.06 
2021 15 14.12 
2022 15 14.37 
 
 
The rise in average percent forecast with EPA projection is more moderate for corn, 
ethanol and cattle price compare to the forecast conditional on RFS requirements. This 
number is also showing almost 2% less decrease for crack ratio which together with less 
ethanol price increase could make E85 more economically feasible. The results of 
conditional forecasting are shown in Table 14. 
 4.6 Concluding Comments 
Combining recent advances in causal flows with time series analysis can provide 
insights of the interactions of energy and agricultural markets. Empirical examination of 
linkages between these two markets has important policy implications in terms of the 
consequences on food and energy prices. This study also informs our understanding of 
the influence of U.S. ethanol policies such as the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) 
mandates on commodity prices in energy and agricultural markets. 
 93 
 
This study shows a significant linkage between agricultural and energy market prices 
mainly transmitted through corn. The results of the directed acyclic graph analysis 
suggest that, in contemporaneous time, corn price fluctuations cause changes in 
soybeans and ethanol prices.   
Innovation accounting methods are employed to summarize the integration between 
agriculture and energy markets. Forecast error variance decomposition suggests that 
ethanol production explains about 10% of the variation in corn and soybeans prices in 
the longer term. Also corn and soybean price rises have effects on livestock prices 
through their role as feedstuffs. Corn price and soybeans price together account for about 
12 and 18 percent of the changes in cattle and hog prices respectively. 
The crack ratio is another important explanatory and reactive factor.  Changes in this 
factor explain about 8.7% of ethanol price changes. After a given positive shock to 
ethanol production the crack ratio will decrease. Moreover, the implementation of 
renewable fuel mandates on ethanol will decrease the average gasoline price by 5.8% by 
2022. Although this result is similar to Du and Hayes (2012)  who believe the effect of 
an increase in ethanol production is a decrease in gasoline price, a finding unlike that in 
Knittle and Smith (2012) who found near zero effects.   
Furthermore, the result of conditional forecasting taking RFS into account, show the 
mandatea increased prices for almost all modeled commodities. We also performed a 
forecasting exercise regarding EIA projection of ethanol accredited for RFS 
consequences in 2022 as affected by a blending wall issue. The results indicate that 
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blending wall issues cause a smaller increase in ethanol price and also smaller decrease 
in gasoline price.  
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CHAPTER V  
CONCLUSIONS  
 
Human activities produce greenhouse gases (GHGs) which are a main driver of 
anthropogenic climate change. Although the main source of GHGs is fossil fuel 
combustion agriculture produces substantial amounts. Also agriculture could offset 
GHGs in a number of ways (IPCC, 2014). For instance the agricultural sector is a 
provider of feedstocks for bioenergy production which is an essential energy option and 
can reduce GHG net emissions.  However mobilizing the mitigation potentials of this 
sector is not easy and has been of recent interest to researchers and policy makers. This 
work studies economic implication of some US GHG mitigation policies.  
This study mainly considered the following issues: 
 Designing a voluntary carbon offset market to deal with additionality and leakage 
issues and at the same time cost effectiveness of the program. 
 Studying economic implications of growing switchgrass on marginal land instead 
of crop land. 
 Examining the price dynamics of energy and agricultural markets and 
investigating the effect of renewable fuel standards on future prices. 
Chapter two of this dissertation examined agricultural sector participation in a 
voluntary carbon offset market. We showed use of a baseline applicable to market 
entrants is essential to gain effectiveness in terms of additionality, leakage and program 
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cost. With no baseline, non additional participants enter the program and claim payments 
without creating additional offsets, and so payments would be higher than additional 
offsets. We then examine the implications of a per unit baseline where we assign all 
mitigation activities an amount they must do better than. This baseline works well to 
overcome non additionality at lower carbon prices but it generates substantially less 
offsets at higher prices due to its discriminatory effects against bioenergy alternatives 
that are little used in the without carbon prices case.  To improve incentives for doing 
better in bioenergy related mitigation strategies we suggest a hybrid baseline where for 
the strategies with small unit levels (like bioenergy and afforestation) in the base 
situation we pay them if they to do better than the total offset in the base model. 
We find that a per unit baseline combined with a hybrid baseline decreases 
traditional agricultural production and so increases commodity prices and in turn results 
in higher producers’ surplus and lower consumers’ surplus. Also we discover the 
program lowers exports from the US to other countries and decreases foreign surplus. 
Moreover, we find market forces are likely to increase international production and 
associated emissions causing leakage.  
Chapter 3 of this work studied the economic implications of growing switchgrass on 
marginal land under RFS requirements. Agronomic advantages of switchgrass make it 
possible to produce it on marginal lands that are not in crop production reducing land 
competition between food and energy. We simulate market penetration, potential GHG 
mitigation, price, production, welfare and environmental effects of using marginal land 
to produce switchgrass with the FASOM-GHG model. 
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We find using marginal land in the absence of a carbon market contributes in 
satisfying RFS cellulosic mandates taking the pressure off of conventional land use. 
Additionally, this will help reduce several agricultural product prices although is not true 
for all agricultural products. Livestock prices decrease as some feedstuff production 
decreases when using marginal land. Under carbon prices we find that the switchgrass 
produced on marginal land largely goes toward producing electricity and the pressure 
remains to meet the RFS2 mandates. We also find that because of added fertilizer and 
fuel consumption, use of marginal land only contributes to GHG reduction when it is 
used along with higher carbon prices. Growing switchgrass on marginal lands does 
generate an income increase for producers and an overall increase in total welfare.  
In chapter 4, we examine the interdependency between energy and agriculture 
markets in the US. We use a VAR framework to study the dynamic relationships 
between the real prices of corn, soybeans, cattle, and hog simultaneously with ethanol 
and a measure of the refining margin – the crack ratio. We also examine the influence of 
RFS mandates on these markets. 
The results show at contemporaneous time corn price fluctuations cause changes in 
soybean and ethanol prices. We also fin RFS requirements cause an increase in all prices 
by 2022 except for crack ratio.  
Across the three essays we find that voluntary offset markets, marginal land for 
biofeedstock production and substituting biofuel for fossil fuels are all policies that 
could exploit agricultural sector GHG mitigation potentials while they also could be a 
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source of increased income for agricultural producers. But some considerations are 
important in their success:  
 Voluntary carbon offset programs need a baseline to prevent non additionality 
and leakage and maintain a cost effective program. A per unit baseline appears to 
be a good choice for most mitigation possibilities but not for ones where baseline 
use of the mitigation possibility is small.  There an approach that permits scale 
increases is needed,  
 While we find growing switchgrass on marginal lands is effective in reducing the 
food versus fuel competition when a carbon market is not present we find that 
when a carbon market comes into being that the switchgrass may well be used to 
produce the higher offsetting bioelectricity without alleviating effects of RFS on 
prices.  We also find that GHG emissions go up unless there are simultaneous 
carbon market incentives. 
 The RFS mandates increase the average ethanol price and decreases gasoline 
price by 2022.  
There are a number of limitations that characterize the work done in this dissertation. 
Studies with FASOM-GHG use a certain projection of future crop and livestock yields 
plus international trade and rate of conversion of biofeedstock into biofuels, which could 
be improved and would affect the results.  Also FASOM-GHG assumes rational forward 
looking decision makers (consumer or producer) which is a strong assumption. Also 
market power is not considered and all markets are assumed to clear under perfect 
information. Moreover, loss of ecological services and other amenities are not accounted 
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for in our studies. Also in vector auto regression modeling we just use a selected subset 
of variables from the agriculture and energy markets. In the real world, there certainly 
are many other factors that can affect every variable of our study.  
Future research could expand the marginal land analysis to consider production of 
other biofeedstocks on marginal land besides switchgrass. Also for more accurate results 
of the influence of RFS on prices one could add advanced biofuel next to corn ethanol in 
the VAR model. Moreover, entering the renewable identification numbers into the model 
would be helpful since it represents a price of ethanol’s credits traded among blending 
industry. 
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